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1CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM: STATEMENT AND JUSTIFICATION
As long as education is considered a form of asso-ciation with free beings who are basically unpredict-able in their ireedom, then we have much to learnfrom the existentialist.
Freedom is more than a political phenomenon. It
cuts deeply into the nature of man and his predicament on
earth. For to be human means to be separated from what we
were in order to approach or return to what we are going to
be in the future. The free condition gives life dignity and
resonance and makes possible what would be meaningless with-
out freedom: love, hope, despair, journeying home and re-
birth. But it also makes possible naaa, mass-man, Don No
One, the flight from freedom and authenticity, that condi-
tion over which so many social scientists in the twentieth
century have expressed alarm.
A great number of these social scientists would
agree with Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey when they say,
"the critical problem toward which all the behavioral sci-
ences must be directed is how man can remain an individual
in society. "1 David Riesman has written much on the other-
directed man who yields to the group rather than maintain
3-Dav.id Krech, Richard Crutchfield, and Egerton
Ballachey, Individual in Society
, p. 529.
2the burden of an inner-directed independence. 2 Rollo May,
who has written prolifically on loneliness and freedom,
says, "We are anxious because we do not know what roles to
pursue, what principles for action to believe in. "3 Again,
Rollo May, echoing hrich Fromm, "Authoritarianism in reli-
gion and science, let alone politics, is becoming increas-
ingly accepted, not particularly because so many people
explicitly believe in it, but because they feel themselves
individually powerless and anxious ."^ More concretely,
Robert Jay Lifton writes of the almost wholesale flight from
responsibility
,
"One searches in vain for a man or a group
of men who will come forward to take the blame or even iden-
tify a human source or responsibility for what took place
[at Mylai],
. .
."3 Erich Fromm notes the pervasiveness of
the feeling of insignificance and powerlessness among indi-
viduals and their consequent escapes from themselves and
from the freedom that involves a dreadful responsibility.^
George Spindler notices the change from traditional values
which asserted the sacredness of the individual to emergent
p David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd .
3ro11o May, Man's Search for Himself
, p. 33*
^Ibid
.
,
p. 51.
^Robert Jay Lifton, "Beyond Atrocity," Saturday Re-
view
,
March 29, 1971, p. 25.
^Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom .
3values which stress sociability and conformity to the group.?
Wylie Sypher traces the loss of self and proclaims, "We do
not have to read contemporary literature to know that we are
living in an age of togetherness, that Americans have ac-
cepted their own special kind of collectivism, as it appears
m the life of the organization man, whose existence is a
mode of conforming to large enterprise."8 Charles Reich
writes in a recent and much reviewed book,
nn
01 llfe does man live under the domina-tio ox the corporate state? It is the life thatwas foreseen in The Cabinet of Dr. Cali raH
• e ropoxis
,
and M, a robot life, in which man isepnved of his own being and he becomes instead
a mere role, occupation, or function.^
Tillich says that in the contemporary process that is going
on people are being "transformed into things, into pieces of
reality which pure science can calculate and technical sci-
ence can control." 10 My own understanding of the massacres
m Vietnam is that in order to shoot women and children there
muot not be some "center" of himself that says automatically
and spontaneously to a man: I do not do these things! There
must not have been for the men who participated in it a cen-
ter of their being or core which defined boundaries.
^George D. Spindler, "Education in a Transforming
Amei ican Culture," in Education and Culture, ed. bv Geore*e
Spindler, pp. 132-172. 6
a
Wylie Sypher, Loss of the Self in Modern Literature
and Art
, p. 9.
~
9Charles Reich, The Greening of America
, p. 121.
10Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be
, p. 137.
4It is not the intent of this paper to examine in
depth the complex reasons behind this void at the center or
the loss of the self* There does exast today a massive and
pervasive assault on the individual’s existence as an authen-
tic human being. Many institutions participate along with
myths in this assault on man. Jules Henry names advertising
as one, "Advertising is an expression of an irrational
economy that has depended for survival on a fantastically
high standard of living incorporated into the American mind
as a moral imperative." 11 Ortega locates the fault in
technology,
. . . technology for all its being a .practically
unlimited capacity will irretrievably empty the
lives of those who are resolved to stake* every-
thing on their faith in it and it alone. . .
Just because of its promise of unlimited possi-
bilities, technology is an empty form like the
most formalistic logic and is unable to determine
the content of life. That is why our time, being
the most intensely technical, is also the emptiest
in all human history. 12
Related to technology and perhaps growing out of it is mod-
ern man’s extraordinary faith in the expert. Raup writes,
Few things are more fraught with danger than this
current trend of thought that would place the re-
sponsibility for social management in the lap of
,
the expert and the executive. As social frustra-
tionsincreases not only do people tend to look
favorably upon the man of action, but the stature
11Jules Henry, Culture Against Man
, p. 45*
120rtega, Mana s , May 15, p. 1.
5increaS^$3 rt
"the aan 0f Pledge-bends to
Couple this with the belief of many investigators that most
people would relinquish the provisions of the bill of rights
without too much anguish and indeed the situation is fraught
with danger. The implications concerning the viability of
a democratic society are enormous.
There are, of course, other explanations for the
loss of self in modern society including the fractionaliza-
tion of people’s lives, specialization of work roles, break-
down of the family, the abstract nature of modern life, etc.
Again, it is not the purpose of this paper to deal primarily
with those factors which promote alienation, loss of self,
and inauthenticity but rather to search for some philosophi-
cal framework within which to comprehend and confront the
phenomena of the loss of self and to investigate and suggest
ways and the extent to which education can play a part in
remedying the dilemma.
Existential philosophers especially address them-
selves to this dilemma of the free man and the search for
authenticity. More directly and more eloquently than any
other group of philosophers, they are concerned with the ’'I,"
the central core of being, the ground of being, the ’’thou"
of human relationships. Existentialist philosophers and
y^Bruce Raup, The Improvement of Practical Intelligence.
pp. 18-20.
6writers as a group are most critical of the systems, insti-
tutions, and technologies that endeavor to destroy the essen-
tial human qualities and disrupt man’s authentic relation to
the world. Strain says, "In terms of its content, modern
existential thinking focuses on the human person in a tech-
nological and scientific age. The institutional organiza-
tion of science, by and for the state, has dehumanized man. ”14
Ralph Harper says that existentialism is the only philosophy
that takes the concrete self and its situation seriously
enough to make it the subject of its inquiry. 15 Leroy
Trouther, speaking of Tillich’s interest in existentialism,
writes, "As Tillich suggests, it is the threat of an infi-
nite loss the loss of their 'authentic self'—that drives
the existentialists to their attack. "I* Suggesting that
interest in Existentialism is growing, Trouther has written,
"The existential thinker as well as today's college student
struggle for the preservation of the person, for the self
affirmation of the self, in a situation in which the self is
more and more lost in its world. "17 Certainly central to
470-471
+PaUl Strain
'
Modern Philosophies of Education
, pp.
15Ralph Harper, "Existentialism and Recognition," Mod-
ern..Philosophies of Education
. Fifty-fourth Yearbook of the
National Society fortHe Study of Education, Part 1, p. 227 .
1
^’Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be
. p. 137.
l^Leroy Trouther, "What Can the Educator Learn from
the Existential Philosopher?" Philosophy of Education Year-
book, p. lor.
“
- ~~
7all the existentialists is the passionate conviction that
the individual in his moment of existence is paramount. Any
system, organisation, group, methodology, or goal which sub-
ordinates the individual human must be attacked. At a time
when technology and management and manipulation are so per-
vasive and rampant, persons must be strong and "present" and
grounded in order that these forces be transcended.
From the above it would seem automatic that since
the goals of existentialist philosophers coincide perfectly
with the goals of public education in a democracy, namely
that the individual and his fullest actualization is of su-
preme importance, that hence much of what existential phi-
losophers have written would have been examined for their
educational implications. Such is not the case, however.
Trouther notes in a reaction to this lack, "Today existential
philosophy represents an intellectual force of such magni-
tude that American educators can no longer afford the luxury
of ignoring it." 18 Besides ignoring these thinkers we seem
more attracted to philosophies and solutions which stand
completely opposite to existentialists. For example, Dr.
James McConnell, a professor of psychology from the Univer-
sity of Michigan writes:
I believe that the day has come when we can combine
sensory deprivation with drugs, hypnosis, and astute
manipulation of reward and punishment to gain almost
18Ibid
.
,
p. 102.
8abs°lute control over an individual's behavior.be Possible then to achieve a very rapidand highly elective type of positive brainwashingthat would allow us to make dramatic changes in aperson s behavior and personality. 19
Such behavioristic, stimulus-responses, Lockean ways of
thinking are not lacking today. In their utopian zealous-
ness such thinkers seem never to ask the most crucial ques-
tion, the one which existential philosophers never stop
asking: what is it that is distinctively human in human
behavior? Educational practices which are not drawn from
the confrontation of this question are therefore anti-human.
It is the purpose of this investigation to move through this
question via existentialist philosophers and then to appro-
priate or make meanings for education.
A review of the literature in education which appro-
priates such insights would include George Kneller's small
book entitled Existentialism and Education
. Van Cleeve Morris
has written some forty pages on existentialism in his Philoso-
phy ir the American School . Pritzkau has written recently
another slim book which heavily uses the language of existen-
tialism called On Education for the Authentic . Articles on
the general topic of existentialism and its implications for
education have been written by Theodore Bramfield, Ralph
Harper, V.. R. Niblett. Leroy Troutner has written a disser-
tation entitled, "Educational Implications of Existentialism:
ames McConnell
,
Manas, May 20, p. 5 .
9An Analysis and Comparison of Martin Heidegger and John
Dewey. " Otto Bollnow and Eduard Spranger have written a
great deal in this area, but little is available in trans-
lation from the original German. Maxine Greene has edited
with some commentary a small but useful book called Exis-
tential Encounters for Teachers
. Ernest W. Dillon has
written a fine dissertation called "Development of an English
Education Course from an Examination of the Existential Con-
cept of Authentic Existence." 20
At this point I'd like to offer some detailed justi-
fications for an existential look at education.
A. Emphasis- on Technique. The emphasis on technique
and on "systematic arrangements" both in society in general
and in schooling in particular has encapsulated man to the
point where he "is" the system. This emphasis has blinded
modern man to the vacuum of ends. This phenomenon is dis-
tinctively American and is probably related to the frontier
and our pragmatic successes in creating a vast industrial
on
Theodore Bramfield, "Existentialism and Education,"
Edu cat 10na1 The ory
,
II (April, 1952) ; Leroy Trouther, "Edu-
cational Implications of Existentialism: An Analysis and
Comparison oi Martin Heidegger and John Dewey" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford Univ.
,
1962); Ralph Harper,
"Existentialism and Recognition," Modern Philosophies of Edu-
cation
,
Filty—iourth Yearbook oi the National Society for
the Study of Education, Part 1; W. R. Niblett, "On Existen-
tialism and Education,
"
British Journal of Educational Studies
.
II (May, 1954); Otto Bollnow, "Risk and Failure in Education,"
in Modern Philosophies in Education; Eduard Spranger, "The
Role of Love In Education ," in Modern Philosophies in Educa-
tion ; E. V/. Dillon, "Development of an English Education
Course. ..." (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University, 1968).
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society. In education, this encapsulation is seen in the
single-minded search for the solutions to school problems in
^J.r
.
an
^
eilg,nt .s. « Modular scheduling, differentiated staffing,
team-teaching, audio-visual programs, behavioral objectives,
performance contracting, simulation games, etc. By arrange-
ments here is meant in fact all of the patterns, controls,
segmenting of tasks, ordered routines, schedules, and cur-
ricula which taken together contribute to a fashioning of
teachers and students in the following directions!
1. teachers and students assume roles and seoarate
from each other,
2. the teacher's function becomes primarily one of
taking students through training patterns,
3. since the learning process consists of roles
which
.
define and locate teachers and students,
questions which would extend meanings and iden-
tity do not get asked, such as: Who am I and
what do I value about myself as I confront with
people? What is meant when someone says that I
am the teacher? When people say this do they
mean I can really be a teacher, or that I must
conform to the plan designed for me? Is the
role of teacher merely to fulfill requirements?
But is that me—myself?
The existentialist philosopher would believe that such "ar-
rangements" have brought man loneliness and alienation rather
than peace and progress. The institutional arrangements of
modern life, including, of course, the school, are dehuman-
izing man, destroying the essential human qualities, and are
disrupting man's authentic relation to the world.
B. Science and the scientific view of man that per-
meates modern education is too reductionist, and they call
into need a broader, mere empirical, more inclusive understand-
11
ing of learning and growth and what constitutes a man's
journey through life. It is not less empirical to let into
our understanding of learning and growth the insights of art
and literature. There is more truth about learning and grow-
ing and "connecting" to what is real in Siddhartha than in
most if not all adolescent psychology books. Our difficulty
with it is that its knowledge comes to us in a different
mode. We must somehow come to terms with the reductionist
limitations of the scientific mode which pervade our under-
standing of man and invade our notions of education. We must
discover what it means to consider the "wholeness and com-
pleteness" of man. Jacques Maritain has said that, "The
primary aim of education in the broadest sense of that word
is to 'form a man' or rather to help a child of man attain
his full formation or his 'completeness as a man.’" What
educator can deny the relevance of the question, "What is
man in his existential wholeness"? And it is the existen-
tialists who can help us here, for they have always known
that literature and art can reveal more of the human condi-
tion and do it with emotional impact. And, furthermore, do
it in a way that doesn't narrow and close down but opens up
into mystery, wonder, and chance.
C. Education has traditionally avoided what Buber
has termed the "between." Because education has been a re-
flection of the prevailing cultural values, it has empha-
sized an impersonal, I-It style in school. The question of
12
the "other," the meaning of the "other," and the encounter
of the "other" are recurring themes in existential litera-
ture, Achieving the "between" is not merely a matter of
deciding between lectures and seminars, classes or individual
study: these are merely playing with "arrangements" again
and are false ways of stating the problem. All of us have
participated in discussions which were useless and have
attended lectures where the lecturer seems to draw us into
an implicit dialogue with him in such a way that the mean-
ings he brings to us activate the meanings we bring to the
hearing of his. A study of existentialism will help us in
understanding the nature of that flow of meaning, or as Howe
calls it, "the dialogical principle. "21
D. Education seems bent on avoiding the human pre-
dicaments: anguish, aloneness, ecstasy, impotence, love,
hate, and freedom. It does this by avoiding even using such
words as the above. But more than that, students are bored
at least in part because instead of schools touching levels
of being deep within persons, there is constant bombardment
of trivia. Silberman has recently written eloquently and
bitterly about the schools' immersion in trivia. 22 -j_s
difficult to appropriate existential meanings or to make
existential meaning from trivia, anu impossible through
2lReuel Howe, The Miracle of Dialogue .
p p
^Charles Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom.
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immersion m trivia to touch one's own resonance and the
resonance of life! There is a second sense in which schools
avoid existential encounter and it js through fostering reli-
ance on external authority and control. Much of schooling
promises that in order to exist one has only to depend on
others rather than oneself, to give up responsibility, to
risk nothing, to avoid failure: in Fromm's words, to escape
freedom. It is difficult here, too, to appropriate existen-
tial meanings. To put it another way, it is unlikely that
one will connect with his own "ground of being" if one is
encouraged constantly to "have his being for others." Donald
Vandenberg says this from a strong existential framework:
The use of commanding/obeying tactics on the partbhe teacher increases the extent of the puDil's
having his being xor others, which increases his
alienation from the world, which makes him more
in-authentically there ... it promotes the illu-
sion, that the reasons of other people are his own,
and it does not help him establish his own reasons
for being there.
But such separation does make good soldiers, both uniformed
and civilian . . .
All these forms and variations of separation that
have been described do not tell of something new in the world.
The opposite of separation is "home" and coming home is the
oldest journey we know, perhaps the only one. Existentialism,
has always been concerned with the search for self, for human
23ponald Vandenberg, "Learning as Co-Disclosure," in
Teaching and Learning
, p. 149 •
14
meanings, and the "way home." If we do not, especially in
school, concern ourselves with the idea of human meanings
and the existential journey, and if we do not become better
at understanding the subtle but extraordinary difficulties
modern living throws in the path of the young as they search
for the way, we will all then continue to serve false gods
instead of the cause of life.
Summary
The design of this paper then will be to investigate
in depth three existential philosophers: Gabriel Marcel,
Karl Jaspers, and Martin Buber. To then- ascertain where the
commonalities exist in the area of human authenticity. To
then relate these insights to education in an attempt to
clear some spaces for an existential education.
In this chapter the purpose and rationale of the
study has been outlined. The gap between the realities of
school practices and the insights into human authenticity by
existential philosophers has been stated.
The second chapter will deal with the existential
ideas and posture of Karl Jaspers with particular attention
paid to the many ways the modern world reduces man.
The third chapter will explore in the same manner
the ideas of Gabriel Marcel with particular attention to his
notions of participation and mystery.
Chapter four will explain the inherent difficulties
15
and dangers in objectifying existentialism into programs and
curriculum.
Chapter five will draw heavily on the ideas of Martin
Buber in developing the area of dialogical teaching. The
ideas of Jaspers and Marcel will also be used here since
Buber's I-Thou relationship contains and envelops Jaspers'
transcendence and Marcel's mystery and participation.
The sixth chapter will be an attempt at curricular-
izing one existential idea, namely death, and justifying its
presence and usefulness as content in education. Here again,
the chapter will draw from Jaspers' limit situations, Marcel's
presence to mystery, and Buber's eternal Thou.
The seventh and concluding chapter will be a discus-
sion of imaginative literature as a tool to uncover the exis-
tential self and make contact with the metaphysics of human
motivation. Chapter seven will contain a concluding state-
ment ,
16
CHAPTER II
KARL JASPERS: THE TRANSCENDENCE OF DASEIN
Karl Jaspers was much concerned with a person’s
existential freedom, for in his own life he had not found
any institution or profession that could satisfactorily an-
swer the important philosophical question, "How to live?"
Jaspers tells us of the philosopher Schelling who wrote that,
"although man, at the beginning of his existence, finds him-
self thrown, as it were, into a stream that overpowers him
completely, still he is not required to allow this stream to
simply wrench him loose and carry him along passively like
an inanimate object." 2^ Without his consent he is brought
into a world that he does not understand. How to live the
good life? This knowledge is gained only with exDerience.
But from what agencies can he learn, and are these agencies
reliable? in brief, how is a member of our civilization to
find out how to live?
Jaspers talks at length about three agencies and the
role they play in aiding people to deal with their philo-
sopnioal questions: the state and its lav/s, religion and
the churches, and psychiatry.
^Schelling, Werke, XIII, p. 202, quoted in Karl
Jaspers
, Charles Wallraff, p. 66.
17
1* -^e State and Its Laws As Guides
There have always been those who profess that obedi-
ence to authority and/or tradition is the only way to good
citizenship and political stability. Sophocles’ Creon in
Antigone represents this view illuminated by his metaphoric
insistence of himself as captain of a ship which must steer
a straight and deliberate course or else chaos will prevail.
Descartes who, content in practical life simply to accept
the demands of religious and secular authorities, said, "In
questions of action, I am guided by the state and the customs
of the country
,
by the example of the best among my fellow
men, and by resoluteness.
"
2 5 Hegel has asserted that virtue
is not a troubling oneself about a peculiar andisolated morality of one’s own; that a striving
for a positive morality of one's own is futile,
in its very nature impossible of attainment;
that in respect of morality the saving of the wisest
men of antiquity is the only one which is true, that
to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral
tradition of one's country
. .
.26
However, we live in a time and knowledge that makes this
point of view difficult: we have been witness to state atroci-
ties both democratic and totalitarian; we see the state’s
inability to provide for changes which occur today at such a
discouraging pace; we note the state’s inability to foresee
the results of advancing technology which the state itself
^Descartes, Three Essays
, p. 156, quoted in Karl
J aspers
, Charles V/allraff , p . 67
.
2
^IIegel, Philosophische Abhandlungere, Werke
,
I, pp.
399-400, quoted in Karl Jaspers
,
Charles Wallraff, p. 67.
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supports: as early as 1932 Jaspers wrote: "While we cannot
as yet show how it could be done, it is by no means unthink-
able that man will eventually prove capable of exploding the
entire earth, leaving behind only a cloud of dust drifting
through the universe"; 27 we’re beginning to understand that
there are limits to a planned society, that man must pay for
this conformity and obedience a heavy price: his moral
aut onomy
.
2. Religion
To Jaspers, however much the church may have achieved
(and of this there can be no doubt), still, when the two
millenia of its history are impartially viewed, it turns out
to have been no more trustworthy or honorable than the state.
It has been neither a good counselor nor a good example. In
fact, it has been repeatedly unreasonable, mistaken, dishon-
est, scheming, power-hungry, unscrupulous, and hyp o critical. 2S
Not the least among the things that make Christianity unpal-
atable and useless to many who seek answers to existential
questions is that unlike some other religions, Christianity
presupposes that it has a monopoly on the truth by which one
should live, and asserts that "it alone not only can make a
universally valid claim, but is actually universal (Catholic;.
27philosophie
.
Vol. I, p. 3.18, quoted in Karl Jaspers
.
Charles Wallraff, p. 70.
2&Charles Wallraff, Karl Jaspers
, p. 77
•
19
Anything less that lays claim to be equally unconditional
is untruth, blindness, wickedness .
"
2<
? j aspers believed,
however: "Only when the poisonous claim to exclusiveness
is laid aside can biblical belief
. . . actualize its true
nature. "30
"For noble men and the pure in soul are quite
discernible outside of Christianity; it would be absurd for
them to be lost, particularly if we compare them with cer-
tain of the most conspicuous Christians in history, who have
been none too lovable or admirable in any human sense. "31
Wallraff points out in addition,
But more important still, exclusiveness meansintolerance, and intolerance "stands forever in
readiness to kindle new fires in which to burnheretics." Because intolerance against intoler-
ance (but only against intolerance) is indispen-
sable; intolerance against the exclusivist claimis necessary when it not only propounds a doctrinefor consideration by others, but strives to forceit on others by law, by compulsory schools, etc. 3
2
There are, of course, other reasons why the church
is denied by many as a source of day-to-day wisdom: its use
of power, its threats of eternal death, its war-like charac-
ter from the very beginning, its actions and interpretations
based on special pleading rather than on what was spiritually
29per Philosophische Glaube
.
p. 83
,
quoted in Karl
Jaspers: An Introduction to His Philosophy
. Charles Wallraff,
3°Per Philosophische Glaube
. p. 508, quoted in Karl
Jaspers
, Charles Wallraff, p. cO.
33-Karl Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy
, p. 69 .
3
2
Ibid
.
, pp. 94-9 5.
20
right and morally just for man. Today there is even a seri
ous crisis in keeping the priesthood intact, so many are
walking away. For the rest? Jaspers says of his futile
attempts to communicate.
It is among the sorrows of my life spent in the
searcn for truth, that discussion with theologians
always dries up at crucial points; they fall si-lent, state an incomprehensible proposition, speakf something else, make some categoric statement,
engage m amiable talk
. . . and in the last analy-
sis they are not really interested.
. . . People
-ike us . . . strike them as merely stubborn. 33
Revealed religion, "where prayer, a cult, and revelation
establish a community and give rise to authority, theology,
and obedience, "34 ps dishonest and hypocritical. To Jaspers,
philosophy offered another prospect,
Every individual experiences an inner conflict be-
tween the desire for obedience with repudiation ofindependent responsibility on the one hand, and
the urge to be free from creeds, cults, and authori-
ties on the otner. ihis decision between religion
and philosophy cannot be avoided unless one is will-
ing to remain in the shady indefiniteness of apathy
and indifference. 3
3
But this choice for freedom presents a challenge:
The liberation which the way of philosophy offers
is not easy, because it provides no tangible evi-
dence, no guarantee, and no court of appeal capable
of providing or pronouncing a final judgment. ‘ To
enter the company of philosophic minds means to have
thereafter no example to follow; no authority to
rely on, no truth to be passively received, and no
33 lbid., p. 77.
3^
-Philosophie, p. 296, quoted in Karl Jaspers, Charles
Wallraff, p. 63.
35ibid., p. 301.
21
historically given revelation to provide salvatione v/ho philosophizes must confirm everything foralways taking full responsibility. No onereceives him into the realm of philosophic minds-the venture is his own.3o v p ° Ulna >
3* Psychiatry (H 2O is Not the Same As Water)
Jaspers considered psychiatry as another example of
theoretical dogma. Though he admitted that the psychoanalyti-
cal school brought to light certain scientific facts, he made
a devastating criticism of its implications for science and
for the human being. He accuses it of making man into the
marionette of his unconscious drives, 37 self-reflection de-
graded into a mechanical hunt for sexual impulses and child-
hood experiences. Jaspers violently disagreed with this
attempt to localize the source of man's being and action.
The psychoanalytical school presupposed they had a total
knowledge of man and were able to project the nature of man.
To Jaspers the being of man cannot be exhausted by even the
best theory, what was most fundamental in man was beyond
anyt-hing that could be established and fixed about him and
^hat__could provide a set basis for prediction and clinical
practice . In viewing man there must always be respect for
the uncertainty surrounding the question as to what man really
is. Man is always more than what can be known about him. If
3 6Von der Wahrheit. p. 965, quoted in Karl Jaspers.
Charles Wallraff
,
pp. §4-#5.
37pi e Geistege Situation der Zeih. quoted in Knuasen,
Idea of Transcendence
, p.
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certain possibilities are realized in him, a description of
these possibilities is not a description of what man is, for
man is always the possibility of realizing something else. 38
Richard Graubau wrotes on psychology:
Informing the whole procedure is the subject-object
structure 01 awareness. A psychological method,
which consists of assumptions, concepts, and tech-
niques of observation and experimentation, is a wavof investigating an object. The object, a humanbeing, is never exhausted by the method.
. . . Thepsychological account oi man yields many partialpictures, each of which is the result of the appli-
cation of a method—determining leading idea.39
Jaspers makes a distinction between "understanding"
(verstehende) and "explaining" ( erkl'arende) psychology.
Explaining psychology is bent on causal explanation of
psychological aata. Jaspers points out, ".
. . since these
are psychic events, which by their very nature have to re—
quaxitati've, such quantification would as a matter of
principle remain impossible without losing the actual of the
inquiry.
Understanding psychology seeks insight into the
meaningful structures which connect psychic phenomena, not
causally, but intentionally. A denial of understanding is
always possible in the interest of the neatness of mechanical
explanation. But it would be an example of a self-closing
3
^AIlgemeine Psychopathologie
.
quoted in Knudsen, p. 6.
3%. Graubau, Existential Philosophers, ed. bv Schrader,
p. 148.
^Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology (University of
Chicago Press, 1963), p. 302.
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world view.^1 To understand psychological material is to
participate in the larger world of which the material is a
part. It is to be existentially aware of the person's way
of being-in-the-world. Since it refuses to accept the level
of Dasein as total, Jaspers' aims at a transcending psychology.
Jaspers believes that the question of man must always
be asked; but scientific inquiry must learn to pause before
the infinity of man and scientific technique must admit its
inherent reductionism. Hence the question "how to live 9 "
must be directed elsewhere.
To Jaspers, the proper starting point is personal
experience as it is given to the person in the immediate
experience of his concrete situation. "The situation is the
beginning • • • of philosophy. • • • It is for me the one
and only form of reality. My thinking starts from it and
returns to it."*4- 2 This is clearly understood in the context
of Jaspers' levels of being. One level is Dasein (being-
there)
•
Dasein is the simple "being-there" of empirical
reality, the pure givenness of the temporal and physical
world. As Jaspers says, "the world of Dasein is the world. . . .
I myself am Dasein as far as I am an empirical being. "A-3
^R. Graubau, Existential PhilosoDhers, ed. bv Schrader.
p. 14a.
^' 2Karl Jaspers, Philosoohie
,
Vol. I., quoted in
Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt
, p. 180.
4-3 ibid
.
,
p. 181.
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Casein would be the quantitative parts of a person that can
be easily collected and subjected to statistical analysis.
It is that revel which the scientist and the behaviorist are
concerned with, but which is dangerous at the point when
they insist that there is nothing but this.
Jaspers' use of the term Dasein is both similar and
different from Heidegger’s. The similarity occurs in their
conceptions of authentic and inauthentic existence. To
Heidegger, human existence, being-in-the-world, is Dasein,
and realizes itself either authentically by resolution or
inauthentically by losing itself in the everyday world of
Das Man. Jaspers conceives of Dasein as empirical being-in-
the-world, man considered as an object; hence, to live only
in the world of Dasein is to live inauthentically. Authen-
ticity to Jaspers involves choice and openness and freedom
and Exist enz.
Dasein or possible existence realises itself in free
existential choice. The person gains an awareness of his
existence in free choice. ’’Freedom is the being of exist-
ence. ... In the act of choice
. .
.
,
in the original
spontaneity of my freedom ... I recognize myself for the
first time as my own true self. "44 In free choice, a person
breaks out of the limitations of Dasein and chooses himself.
.uxistenz, the next level of existence for Jaspers,
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is the being that I am, through this freedom to choose one-
self. As Casein I am not Existenz but only possible Existenz.
Existenz can never be the object of knowledge.« It is a
level of being beyond Dasein.
To Jaspers the level of being beyond Dasein is im-
possible to approach from an empirical route. He elucidates
in Philosophi e:
If everything that cognitive orientation yields inthe form oi universally and necessarily validknowledge is to be called "world," then the ques-tion arises as to whether being extends beyond thewor d, and thought beyond orientation within the
world, ihe soul and God—or Existenz and Trans-
cendence as we say when we exchange the ianeuace
of mythology for that of philosophy—lie outside
u • u
T/
'
r°rld # '• e cannot know them in the sense in
which we know things within the world.
. . . Al-though uhey are not known, they are not nothing • • .46
Existenz is not an object; it is not accessible to scientific
approach; it is the uninvestigatable self; it is Antigone 1 s
driving source, it is the source of Camus' hero who rises up
and says no, it is a mystery especially to the unpossessing,
"it is only real to those in whom it develops and reaches
fruition from an inner source" ;47 it is inaccessible to
psychological understanding and psychological guidance, for
they cannot answer the question of why Antigone must bury
her brother or why Socrates refuses to placate the jury.
45ibid
.
,
p. I83 .
46philosophie
, Vol. II, p. 1, quoted in Karl Jaspers,
Charles Wallraff
,
p. 96 .
47philosophie
,
Vol. I, p. 242, quoted in Karl Jaspers
,
Charles Wallraff, p. 96,
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What iS recJuired here is not a scientific study of the psyche
but an illumination of Exist enz.
Exist enz is uniqueness and singularity. It is the
unrepeatability of the individual.^8 It is the opposite of
the personna or mask or role which is played or behaviors and
costumes which society prescribes. It is not just a process
within the 'world but a source from beyond that makes its
appearance within the world . *+9 d .• 1S not a possession but
a possibility held in abeyance whenever ordinary habit pat-
terns assume control of our conduct in the everyday world.
Jaspers raises hard questions about education for Existenz
when he says that it is not a goal but a source and cannot
be aimed at by a methodological procedure. One does not say,
"I intend to existieren from this moment on." "It is not a
goal but a source. "50 Pointing the way for Maslow's self-
actualized man and Fromm’s authentic man, Jaspers says,
Existenz does not issue in the arbitrary caprice of anar-
chical behavior but in the highest moral decisions ."51
’Since it underlies the self-identity that makes possible
responsible behavior (e.g. reliability in connection with
promises and contracts, incorruptibility, undeviating
4o pe-q philosophische Glaube
. pp. 118-119, quoted in
Karl Jaspers
. Charles VJallraff, p. 100.
49Ibid.
SOphilosophie
,
Vol. II, p. 5, quoted in Karl Jaspers.
Charles Wallraif, p. 101.
‘
51
^ Ibid..
,
p. 4.
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loyalty), it expressions contrast sharply with the moment-
to-moment existence of animalian man. "52
While a person is the free choices he makes, there
is always risk and uncertainty in choices. Thus the exer-
cise of freedom is pervaded by dread. Surely this is the
reason why people remain on the level of Casein. The defi-
nitions and objectification of Dasein avoid the existential
dread of choosing oneself. "There is no freedom without the
threat of possible despair. "53 T ,p Jaspers also says, "He who
wants to be true must take the risk of erring and of placing
himself in the wrong. "54 In a statement which would oer_
tainly place Jaspers in the midst of today's vitriolic dia-
logue, he says, "Existential choice is not obedience to an
objectively formulated imperative (dasein), but obedience to
an internal imperative (existens)." Authenticity means genu-
ine free choice of self that opens the person to Transcendence.
Freedom: I Am Less Free But Closer To Home!
It was nooed before that, "Existence does not issue
in the arbitrary caprice of anarchical behavior but in the
_
5 2Ipn der Wahrheit
, p. 83
,
quoted in Karl Jaspers.
Wallraif
,
pi lul. 1 1
53Reinhardt, the Existentialist Revolt
, p. 196.
54-Karl Jaspers, Philosophic
, Vol. II, quoted in
Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt
, p. 201.*
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highest moral decisions."55 Paradoxically ther£^ &
hint here not of freedom but of necessity. But let us back
up a bit and approach carefully.
Jaspers seems to strongly identify Existenz with
freedom. "While living beings are simply there empirically,
Existenz has its being in freedom. "56 It is nQt the goal
but the source of philosophizing, a source to which I trans-
cend when I come to myself philosophically.
"Existenz is
constantly confronted by the choice of being or not being.
I am only in the earnestness of decision. "57 The approach
to Existenz, then, must begin with freedom. However, since
Jaspers shifts the meaning of Existenz to freedom then free-
dom like Existenz is indefinable. Neither language nor sci-
ence nor philosophy can answer the existential questions
that all people ask, "What is being?" "What does it mean to
state that the world .is or that I am?"
As we have seen, Dasein is not Existenz. My empiri-
cal self is a reduction necessarily. Psychology and psycho-
logical analyses of myself are examples of Dasein. I realizee
Existenz when, in my search for a secure anchor of being I
recognize that it is my own concrete self, my immediate
..
55phixosophie
, pp# 2-4, quotea in Karl Jaspers.
Wallraff
,
p. 103.
" 1
56Ibid., p. 2.
57per Philosoohische Glaube
. p. 118, quoted in Karl
Jaspers
, Wallraff
,
p. 103.
'
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experience which contains the key to Existenz. "My own con-
crete self in . . . the situation is the beginning ... of
philosophy. ... It is for me the one and only form of
reality.
. . . My thinking starts from it and returns to
it."5B To Jaspers the personal concrete experience is the
hidden ground of oneself, that which never becomes an object
and which therefore can neither be rationally known nor con-
ceptually defined. It is the origin out of which I think
and act and of which in rare moments of insight I am indubi-
tably certain. And when I act out of this certitude which
grows out of my very being, in this act of choice, on this
"original spontaneity of my freedom ... I recognize myself
for the first time as my own true self." 59 0nly in those
moments when I exercise this free act of choice am I fully
myself and feel the certitude of absolute being; no abstract
intellectual operations nor any emotional, sentimental, or
instinctive impulses can ever impart to me a comparable ex-
perience. in deciding I break one of the limitations of
my Dasein. ihis act of freedom is the beginning and source
and origin of my true personal authenticity. "Existence
creates itself in this act fertilizing the desert of being
with the lifeblood of personality. "6l
^Philosophic I, p. 3. 59Philosophie II, p. 180.
^Reinhardt, Existentialist Revolt
, p. 81.
6lIbid
.
,
p. 1$2.
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And freedom carries with i +
certitude: not in the cogito (I
J
ts own
eligo (I choose) lies the guarantee of
} buVn theSo that the Cogito. ereo ®?lstence.
am) of Descartes becomts a^ElLf“rLtherefore I am) in the formulatfoA of Jao^ri*62 °Se ’
Over and over again in third force psychology we
come upon the paradox of necessity in f™.Hnn And in
Jaspers again, we have the idea that freedom presupposes a
law, that a human act of freedom is impossible without a
law. In fact Reinhardt says that this law "is the indis-
pensable condition of my freedom . "63 This law ±e an inter_
nal, personal law rather than an external, universal norm.
Existential choice is not obedience to an objectively for-
mulated imperative but my obedience to an internal imperative.
It is Bruno choosing to burn at the stake rather than yield
to the demands of the Inquisition, or Luther saying, "Here I
stand; I cannot do otherwise." Here freedom is united with
necessity and choice seems beyond the control of the indi-
vidual. And it is at this point that we are close to Jaspers*
idea of Transcendence.
Transcendence
The world stubbornly resists objectification as ifthis stubbornness were a testimony of an elusive
and transcendent being.
Jaspers* entire philosophy is directed toward finding
an ultimate ground which is beyond the objective, and thus
6 ^Ibid
., p. 182. 63Ibid
., p. 182.
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beyond any generality under which something could be sub-
sumed. He want s to discover a ground which will be out of
the reach of what are for him the inevitable disintegrating
effects of endless reflection. His goal is to always make
philosophy yield more than meaningless fragmentation.
The world, to Jaspers, can never be articulated into
a complete system. Completeness remains, at best, an idea.
This incompleteness is itself taken as a sign of Transcend-
ence. For when consciousness seeks the common denominator
for all of reality, it finds itself before the void. There
is no common denominator for all of reality. Being and mean-
ing Cannoo be regained except by the transcendence to that
which is above understanding. The sense of Exist enz is de-
pendent upon the breakdown of the attempt of consciousness
to find a concentration point within that which is known. The
shattering of the attempt to find the concentration ooint by
way of thought is a necessary moment in Jaspers* method .
^
It is only in this "shipwreck" that the true direction to the
self and to Being itseli is opened. It is only because one
has tried to find a handhold in thought and failed that he
can enter into that tension that can yield Transcendence. To
choose this tension requires freedom and freedom is made pos-
sible by a hidden God, one who speaks ambiguously.
It must be pointed out that Transcendence is not an—
6^-Knudsen, Idea of Transcendence in the Philosophy of
Karl Jaspers
, p. 179*
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other word for God. The experience of Being can only come
through the realization of self-insufficiency. This reali-
zation Jaspers calls Shipwreck.
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see that^they are> not'cLpletrenoSgreve^to^u^0tiiy my actions objectivelv Tn J'-1 -’grasp my freedom, my limit^y IjusU^SKy!^1
Boundary-Situations
These boundary situations, like all existential ref-
erences, are not objectively demonstrable; they must be lived
through. To one who is conscious of it in his very being as
Existenz, and accepts it and appropriates it and does not
try to escape it by objectifying it, it gives life its exis-
tential quality*
Some boundary situations put to question the very
meaning of Existenz. They are: death, suffering, conflict,
and guilt. Death, when appropriated existentially as my
death or experienced as the death of one with whom I have
been in communication, rather than just as an objective event
which happens to people, raises the question about the sig-
nificance of life and the destiny of personal existence.
Death points up the finitude of our being, and this finitude
occasions decision: we do not have an infinity of chances or
6
^Philosophie
. p.
phers
, ecu 5y
_
E chrader
,
723 t quoted in Existential Philoso-
p. i40.
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an infinity of time to utilize them. We can irretrievably
lose ourselves and die without ever having lived. In this
situation, an honest appropriation stimulates us to sort out
the important from the trivial and to decide between them.
.
Richard Graubau writes:
Death is a limit or boundary to Exist enz. ... Itbrings us to a brink; we must decide how to takeit, y.hat to do in the face of death which points
up tne fact that we must give ourlives meaning and
>
^^nat it is not written objectively in the
scheme of things. Death presents a challenge toliving: we are called upon in its presence to de-termine how we shall live considering that we are
* • • However i may instead dissipate mylife in redoubled efforts to cover up death and se-
cure my lii e in the world. • . . Freedom comes tothe fore in the face of death. 66
(The subject of death as a limit situation and its presence
in school curriculum will be discussed in a separate section.)
Similarly, conflict, suffering, and guilt function as
boundary situations when the limits and the ambiguities of
life become apparent, when the answers ’’are not written ob-
jectively in the scheme of things,” as they never are. What
makes us most human is not simply the necessity of choice-
making: even animals choose. The crucial aspect is aware-
ness of the limits and boundaries we face in choice-making,
awareness of the precariousness of life in the world. Suffer-
ing, for example, reveals our inability to achieve finality
in temporal extension. Conflict shows that communication may
^^Richard Graubau, Existential Philosophers
, ed. by
George Schrader, Jr., p. 41.
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never quite succeed, there is no objective guarantee in the
nature of things that it can overcome the hostilities between
man. And guilt comes from the failure to realize all of one's
possibilities. And guilt is part of our lot. Not only be-
cause we never actualize all our potential but, in addition,
our actions have unintended consequences. As Kant pointed
out, we are never without corrupting even the purest motives
by considerations of the "dear self." These are limit situa-
tions and must be faced in order to live authentically accord-
ing to existentialists. And facing them means facing one's
choices, the problematics of freedom, the indeterminateness
of living and choosing: it means becoming concretely aware
of being human.
The Enemies of Authentic Existenz
Jaspers in his Dook, Man m the Modern Age , sharoly
analyzed and criticized the present age and in so doing gives
us a graphic portrayal of his view of inauthentic man.
He sees, as others do, technology radically altering
the conditions of modern life.^ Population has increased
and life has been increasingly organized and standardized.
Life now is dominated by a vast web of apparatus in which
millions of human individuals perform regular and machine-
like functions. The tendency has been to mechanize and
°^Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age
, p. 34.
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standardize not only routine acts that maintain the system,
but human thought and life itself. Philo Pritzkau writes of
the tendency toward "arrangements" especially as it relates
to education:
The external authority is constantly involved inputting people and what they do into ordered ar-
m^ffenTh* Teachers placed in thesHrrange-ents. ey are trained to find their place he?eand_to train others to do likewise. The design is
tha-
n
?hp
Ve people
^
in training tasks so completely
^
ere 13 n ° ^ lme question where they are orwhat the> are about. Perhaps the first picturethat comes to mind as ^ a person thinks about being
di!a i heVl the i b0xlike container which is the 5
various^att prn
c 'i
:
assrooins • Along with this are theus patte ed arrangements in the forms of
nn°*
S
ii'
wo?b ° oks ’ manuals, courses of studyand so o all of which contribute to the fashion-
Cne
p
ln the ways of conducting "school.''Coupled with this are the various controls which
establish the
_ heirarchy of communication channels,the segmentation of tasks, the ordered routine, the
unquestioned sequential arrangements, and the di-
viding oi people into working compartments. [All
arej ... involved in a meaningless routine.
All these arrangements merely result in people being taken
through training patterns. They encase the mind in a way
that precludes awareness. The reasoning seems to be that
the more man can view himself as an object (dasein) in the
world, as a part of the system, the more smoothly the whole
technology will run.
It is quite obvious that in the conditions just de-
scribed, neither authentic meanings nor Existenz can thrive.
Jaspers says, "Tne masses are our masters and for everyone
68Philo Pritzkau, On Education for the Authentic
, p. 2.
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who looks facts in the face, his existence has become de-
pendent on them, so that the thought of them must control
his doings, his cares, his duties.
.
."69 Freedom in
Existens involves a burden and anguish, and so most surren-
der to the machine-like and perform regularly their routin-
lzed functions. And in the process, we split off from our
own concrete situations, become separated from our own being
James Herndon describes such a splitting off into a Dasein
mode of existence when he describes a parent who came to
visit him about his son's difficulties in school:
0pePed UP verT fiercely by informing methat he knew the boy needed discipline, that he
was willing to do his part, followed with a list
?
1
^
P
!f
1
i?ninents . he . was PrePared to inflict and said1 had his permission to be tough, to belt the kid
around when he needed it, and so on. He was ac-
cepting a role which is pretty familiar to teach-
dp is what they mean when they write Parents
Cooperative on cumulative folders— . . . .
I told him that those punishments weren’t any-
thing new, were they? Hadn't he and the boy's
teachers agreed every year, and hadn't they beltedhim and restricted him and kept him after school
and isolated him and xorbade TV and made him sit
two hours in his room every night to study and senthim to the office and paddled him and suspended himfor seven years of school days and wasn't it clear
that however wonderful and cooperative those plans
were, that they hadn't worked?
Yes. He recalled that in kindergarten the boy
spent an entire half year just sitting in the of-
fice, never being allowed to go to class or out to
recess, because he was so bad. Then he said
harshly. How can a kid that young be that bad? and
burst into tears. It was a great relief to both
of us. After a bit vie viere able to talk about our
own school days and how we didn't always dig them
nor tne scnool us, and that we guessed vie viere
6^Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age
, p. 40.
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both making it O.K. as adults no matter what theschool might have thought of us, and then he saidthought the kid was a pretty goodid if a little wild and stubborn maybe, and howhe even tnought him a pretty smart kid and how
il9..?.A tngy. £Qt along to gether working or goiyy~ nvit-
tettTng thems e1ves~~go~out^
e
r
and by believing his boy to be stupid and bad. 70
So much for the power of training patterns, objective exist-
ence (dasein), and having one's being for someone else, ex-
cept to note that Jaspers urges all to resist the tendency
to view themselves as objects and to resist the dehumanizing
trends by resolutely defining themselves by free choices.
He says, "the basic problem of our time is whether an inde-
pendent human being in his self-comprehended destiny is still
possible, "71
'
;
°James Herndon, How to Survive in Your Native Land,
pp. 112-113.
7-*-Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age
, p. 241.
CHAPTER III
GABRIEL MARCEL
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Perhaps
_th e ultimate question is whether beinp- iqldentmed with truth or with reverence. S
One of the difficulties in reading Marcel like other
existentialists is his rejection of logical, official, and
technical vocabulary. Rather he embraces a dialogical,
anti-digmatic attitude and a reliance upon the situation of
the dialogue in which one person joins with another in a
common inquiry. Both Marcel's journals and his dramas are
examples of his invitation to common inquiry. Thus his style
becomes his philosophy: open, dialogical, questioning, non-
logical, unsystematic, non-reductive—in other words, human.
Marcel believes that man is mystery; that is, when
he is not violated and distorted by the many forms by which
reduction occurs in modern society. Any philosophy or meta-
physics of man must return to man his concreteness and his
situaoionality. To Marcel, the disease and evil of modern
times is this lack of concreteness, this reducing of men.
The Spirit of Abstraction
language is abstraction. In fact man is an ab-
stracting animal. Abstraction represents the finitude, his
limits. V/e select out of the total reality what we want and
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need to select out. We leave behind everything else. Our
language does the same: each word is a reduction of what is
real in its complexity, fluidity, and differentiation. Per-
haps a discussion of one of these will help to understand
Marcel* s spirit of abstraction a bit better.
Reality, it seems to me, consists of things infinitely
different or to put it differently, there is an infinite de-
gree of differentiation. The leaves in autumn, for instance,
traverse an infinite span of color differentiation. Our
language, on the other hand, is usually two-dimensional,
sometimes three. For all those beautiful and infinite shades
of color, we have a very limited amount of words: red, yel-
low, yellowish-red, bright red, dull red, and so on. Hence
language by its very nature reduces reality. V/e always have
to ignore or set aside much of reality partly because our
equipment is limited, our senses in addition to our language,
and partly because we choose not to see what is alien to our
purposes.
Our words themselves are abstractions in another
sense. The word daughter, for example, is a short-cut term,
selecting out from all that person's characteristics only
those similarities she shares in common with other girls,
namely a bend or relationship with parents. All other char-
acteristics are excluded. It should be clear that all these
words I'm using, for example girls
,
are abstractions in the
same way*
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Marcel believes that, on a larger scale, the ulti-
mate abstraction (reduction) is the philosopher's:
Philosophical rationalism can be of* no help inresolving the many problems and dilemmas of human
existence; all its attempts to this effect must
of necessity fail, because it removes all theseproblems from the concreteness of reality. Its
c
^Yj 1?g . for "objective verification leads to the
artificial dualisms of subject and object, "appear-
ances and things m themselves," the empirical
and tne thinking ego, individual thought and
"thought in general." What is "thought in gen-
eral but thought v/ithout a thinker, thought emp-tied of personality? It is thus impotent in
regard to the concrete, individual human destiny. 72
Inis abstraction can be more clearly seen when we
consider Marcel's two different kinds of "reflection," pri
mary and secondary.
Primary reflection is that of the scientist but not
limited to him. It is thinking about externals, it is obser-
vation and verification. It is knowledge confined to the
sphere of "seeing" and "having," that is, a purely scientific
and technical knowledge. Its center is not the existing
individual but "thought in general," the impersonal thinking
Oj. "Das Man. " it is Marcel's conviction that every episte-
mology which rests on "thought in general" inevitably leads
to a "democratization of knowledge" which ultimately means
the self-destruction of knowledge. Such an epistemology
tends to glorify the purely "technical man," the "man in the
street," the "common man." Marcel v/rites:
72Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt
, pp. 207-20S.
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Philosophical and metaphysical knowledge is essen—
°PPos ed to "das Man," The immortal glory of
a Kierkegaard or a Nietzsche consists in havingdemonstrated, not so much by rational arguments asby their lives, that a philosopher worthy of the
name is not, cannot be, and must not be a man of thepublic, oi meetings, and conventions; that he de-bases himseli to the extent that he allows himselfto be deprived of that solitude which is his proper
vocation.
Secondary reilection, on the other hand, consists
in asking about the primary reflection! what are the con-
ditions which make it possible? and what are the limits of
the situation?
Reduced by the State
Marcel, for me more clearly than Jaspers, deals with
the dangers to the numan being of the reductionist tendencies
of modern society, tendencies which obscure the mystery of
life. "There are sectors of human life in the present world
where the process of automatization applies not only, for in-
stance, to certain definite techniques, but to what one would
have formerly called the inner life, a life which today, on
the contrary, is becoming as outer as possible. "7^ Somehow
that level of living and attention and what Marcel calls
"presence" which make for humanly intimate relationships has
been reduced. Marcel claims that we are living in a world
in which the preposition "with" and the noun "togetherness"
73Marcel, Etre et Avoir
,
p. 145, quoted in Reinhardt,
pp. 213-214.
^Mystery of Being
, pp. 30-31.
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seem more and more to be losing their meaning. He says:
It is, or so it seems to me, by starting from thefact of the growingly complex and unified social
organization of human life today, that one can see
most clearly what lies behind the loss, for indi-
^ih-U-3-lo
,
01 life s old intimate quality. In what
does this growingly complex organization—this so-
cialization of life, as we may call it—really con-
sist?
^
Primarily, in the fact that each one of us
is being treated today more and more as an object,
whose behavior ought to contribute towards the
progress of a certain social whole, a something
rather distant, rather oppressjiye, let us even
frankly say rather tyrannical .
h
Marcel explains that the danger is that a person may confuse
(reduce) himself, his real personality, his mystery, with
the State* s official record of his activities and that we
ought to be really frightened of such an identification.
There is a book by C. Gheorgiu called The Twenty-fifth Hour
where a young man who has been falsely denounced to the
Germans by nis father—in—law is sent to a deportation camp
as being a Jew; he has, however, no means of proving that he
is not a Jew. But he is labeled as such. Later, in another
camp, he attracts the attention of a Nazi leader, who dis-
covers in him the pure Aryan type; he is taken out of the
camp and has to join the S.S. Now he is labeled as ’’Pure
Aryan.” He escapes with some French prisoners and joins the
Americans; he is first hailed as a friend but a few days later
he is put into prison: according to his passport, he is a
Rumanian subject. Rumanians are enemies, ergo • . . not the
least account is taken of what the young man himself thinks
7^Ibid
. » pp* 34-35«
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and feels. At the end of the book, he has managed to get
back to his wife. But World War III arrives and husband,
wife, and child are all put into a -amp again by the Ameri-
cans, as belonging to a nation beyond the Iron Curtain.
Appeals are made, a photograph is taken, and the novel ends
with the words, "Keep Smiling."
Of this novel and others such as 1984
. Marcel says,
The point, here, is not only to recognize that thehuman, all too human, powers that make up my life
no longer sustain any practical distinction between
myself and the abstract individual all of whose
particulars" can be contained on the few sheets
of an official dossier, but that this strange re-
duction of a personality to an official identity
must have an inevitable repercussion on the way I
am forced to grasp myself; what is going to become
o^ this inner life, on which we have been concen-
trating so much of our attention?76
Even our solutions point to how completely we have accepted
a reduced idea oi ourselves as human beings. We continue,
for example, in our belief in the possibility of benevolently
readjusting our human affairs, a belief that has persisted
throughout the 19th century among various schools of ration-
alists and into the 20th century among political and social
scientists. We still, for example, hope that a system of
thought, if not Marxian, then some other abstraction, will
set things right. Marcel notes, "there is nothing easier
than to imagine an analgesic technique for this purpose. "77
7^Ibid
.
,
p. 36.
77ibid
., p. 43.
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Reduced by Technique
Technique is part of the reductive degradation of
man. Marcel says:
In our contemporary world it may be said that the
smooth r
an
^?
comes dependent on the technioues whosefunctioning assures him a tolerable life atthe material level, the more estranged he becomesfrom an awareness of his inner reality. I shouldbe tempted to say that the center of gravity of sucha man and his balancing point tend toMecome elter-
more in^^objects! f . h!7lr°jeCtS himself more and
How does this separation take place? Perhaps because tech-
niques are procedures applied to problems and problems are
things which I meet, which I find complete before me and
which I there! ore can lay siege to and reduce. But a human
being is a mystery and a mystery is something in which I my-
self am involved and it constitutes a sphere in which the
distinction between what is in me and what is before me loses
its meaning. Mystery transcends technique, whereas technique
objectifies and reduces. Mystery invites participation.
Speaking in another sense of the separation which technical
progress brings about, Marcel says:
Between any sort of mechanical apparatus and its
possessor there cannot be established that living
that almost latently spiritual relationship, that*
exists, j. or instance, between a small—holder andhio piece of land: that exists there, because the
very notion of the cultivation of the ground im-
plies, also, the notion of an extraordinary ex-
change—
—a mutual, patient traffic between the land’s
fruitfulness and the peasant’s care. But is it not
'
lianas
, p. 55.
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rather the case that in the world where techniaueis triumphant this idea of "exchange,” has lostits old values.
. .
.79 ’
Ortega has said as much:
Technology for all its being a practically un-
Ti^j-ted capacity will irretrievably empty thelives of those who are resolved to stake every-
thing on their faith in it and it along.
. . .
Just because of its promise of unlimited possi-
bilities technology is an empty form like the mostformalistic logic and is unable to determine the
content o±. life. That is why our time, being the
most intensely technical, is also the emptiest in
all human history.hU
Ts it a question of ordering the technology as so many be-
lieve today? or ordering ourselves? But ordering ourselves,
be it noted, is a philosophical task.
Marcel tasks always of the mystery at the heart of
being. And that it is important for man if he would find
peace in the world and in himself, to touch this mystery.
But there are enemies which keep us from this sense of mys-
tery: all the forms of reduction including technique. Marcel
would like to mark out a sphere of being to which techniques
are never able to gain access, a sphere of being he calls
the meta-technical (on the analogy of the metaphysical). He
mentioned once to students in Great Britain:
Calculating machines rightly astonish us, and for
my own part I am quite incapable of saying to what
degree of perfection they may be brought. But what
we can certainly affirm is that it will never be
possible to construct a machine capable of interro-
79ibid * ; p. 5$.
^Ortega, Marias, May 29, 1968, p. 3*
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£atinr itself on the conditions that make it possible
and on the limits of its own range of operations. ...
Marcel believes passionately that there is an intimate link
between this reflection and the mystery of being, and that
the more technique advances, the more such reflection is
thrust into the background. The progress and diffusion of
techniques tend to create a spiritual and intellectual atmos-
phere (or more precisely, an anti-spiritual and anti-
intellectual atmosphere) as unfavorable as possible to the
exercise of reflection.
At this point I could declare that the increasing
use of technique in education today, from teaching machines
to packaged learning kits to behavioral modification tech-
niques, etc.: all of which threaten to remove the possibility
of reflection. But I will save this for another chapter. But
what should be reflected on is that technique and method
(including educational methods) objectify people and make of
them functionaries. They usurp spaces that people need both
to reflect and to share those reflections with each other.
They prevent mistakes and disappointment; they provide a kind
of security. In an existential sense, to pursue security is
to diminish oneself! Marcel asks whether we are planters and
harvesters accepting the possibilities of disappointment, as
the owner of a vineyard, for example, may see his loving care
destroyed by a hailstorm; or are we assembly line workers who
have precluded failure through acceptance of thorough control
hi
of all conditions surrounding us? The choice Marcel’s meta-
phor is suggesting is that we gain from living (or teaching
or learning) as much as we dare to risk of our whole selves.
We can choose to "create ourselves" and "extend our own
meanings" as stepping out into the unknown, or we can ob.jec -
tif£ ourselves through accepting values, opinions, custom
and becoming functionaries of the technique-ological brave
new world.
Marcel believes that such a world soon ends up in a
situation where techniques become techniques of sin and for
sin—techniques at the service of sin.^3-
Quite generally, we can in fact say that the devel-
opment of techniques does inevitably tend to give
a primacy, at the practical level, to the idea of
out. put . Given these conditions, a being whose out-
put has fallen below a certain level and become
practically nil will, from the point of view of a
world in which technique rules, a technocratic
world, be regarded as an unprofitable charge on
the society which still feels itself bound to care
for and maintain him. And the phrase "care and
maintenance," which is used of machinery, is very
revealing in this new context. Man is thought of
on the model of a machine. . . .82
Surely the many reductive manifestations in the world of edu-
cation of this machine-model need not be repeated. They are
all-pervasive. And shocking given the degrading and reduc-
tive forces in the world today, a world flirting with mass-
suicide no doubt as a result of these very same degrading
^Manas, p. 95*
k^lbid . For a penetrating discussion of this model in
education, see Education and the Cult of Efficiency .
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and reducing forces. Shocking it is that intelligent people
will not scream out more loudly to proclaim that man must
have his whole-ness returned, his inviolable and irreducible
mystery again.
Mystery and Being
How may v;e approach mystery and being? It should be
recognized that an approach and a definition are possible to
a limited extent. Marcel writes, "... I suspect that the
characteristic of this need is that it can never be wholly
clear to itself. 3 There is, however, no more important
task, philosophically, than to attempt to pierce through to
this ontological need. Without such reflection, we end with
despair and betrayal. Speaking of the connection between
hope and mystery, Marcel says:
Hope consists m asserting that there is at the heart
°f being, oeyond. all data, beyond all inventories
and ail calculations, a mysterious principle which1
^.
1
^
connivance with me, which cannot but will thatwhich I will, ii what 1 will deserves to be willed
and is, in iact, willed by the whole of my being. 34
It remains true nevertheless for Marcel as for most
existentialists that hope and despair are inseparable. While
the world we live in permits—and may even as the modern world
does absolute despair, yet it is only such a world that can
give rise to hope. Marcel himself explicitly gives thanks to
^The Philosophy of Existentialism
, p. 13.
%bid., p. 28.
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the great pessimists in the history of thought. But this
gets us no closer to mystery and being. The difficulties
are due to the fact that mystery and being are more than any
objects or ideals and since then, an objective knowledge of
being is impossible, the knowledge which can partially un-
veil the ontological mystery must be of a different kind.
Marcel says in dealing with the definition problem:
As for defining the word "being,” let us admit thatit is extremely difiicult. I would merely suggestthis method ox approach: being is what withstands
—
or what would withstand—an exhaustive analysisbearing on the data of experience and aiming to re-duce them step by step to elements increasingly de-
void of intrinsic or significant value. 2 5
But such a method implied in the above is a "negative" method
and Marcel implies strongly that the knowledge we are after
will be a knowledge arrived at by exclusions rather than by
positive affirmations. For example, in talking of the methods
of science, he reveals its limitations and in addition offers
an instance of knowledge arrived at by exclusions, "A phil-
osophy that stresses the activity of verification, ends by
ignoring presence through love which infinitely transcends
all possible verification, because it exists in an immediacy
beyond all conceivable mediation.
Mystery and Participation
In order to get closer to Marcel’s idea of "being,"
an explanation of his distinction between problem and mystery
S6£5jbid
., p. 14. Ibid . , p. 15.
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may be of help.
For a man to recognize the presence of being and
thereby to achieve authenticity, it is necessary to approach
being as a mystery, not as a problem. Marcel explains:
A problem is something which one hits upon, some-thing thcio blocks one's way. It is wholly in front
oi me. A mystery, on the contrary, is something in
which I lind myself engaged, whose essence it is
consequently not to be wholly in front of me. It
seems that in this realm the distinction between
"within myself” and "in front of myself” loses all
significance. s7
This distinction not only illuminates what Marcel means by
primary and secondary reflection but also the difference
between scientific and philosophical knowledge. If I re-
flect on the presence (empirical reality) of an object or a
person, the simple being-there of either one, that is an
example of primary reflection. What is important to note
immediately is that in such primary reflection, there has
already occurred the subject-object split. If I reflect on
what conditions make it possible for me to "contact" that
object or person, I have to recognize some prior acts on my
part to "participate" in this object or person. Without
this prior act of participation, the object does not exist;
without this "other," I do not exist. Such secondary reflec-
tion is what allows us to deal with such phenomena as commu-
nication, presence, participation, etc. It is there that it
is possible to re-unite object and subject.
^Vfiarcel, Being and Having
,
quoted in Reinhardt, The
Existentialist Revolt
,
p. 214.
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The same holds true for problem and mystery and sci-
entific investigation and philosophical reflection. Problems
concern obstacles that are inventoried and manipulated. As
m all scientific investigation, there is a clear distinc-
tion between subject and object. The problem "in front of"
the investigator is objectively, disinterestedly approached
and a solution, objective, verifiable, and public to all, is
produced. The investigator is a depersonalised subject in
his inquiry.
Marcel does not protest against this approach but
insists, as does Jaspers, that the objective approach as the
uuly method of studying reality must not be relied on as
fully us 2Gth century man does. This approach does not do
full justice to human experience. Humans are more than what
we can know of them. Human experience includes mysteries
which are beyond the problematical and inaccessible to the
impersonal objectivity of science. This realm of mystery
Marcel calls the "metaproblematical." The metaproblematical
is not unknowable, Marcel says. It is only from the proble-
matic approach. "To posit the metaproblematical means to
think the primacy of being in its relation to knowledge . . .
to recognize that knowledge is enveloped by being. "^9 The
natural urge to objectify mysteries and to reduce them to
82".
. . and public to all" means a democratization of
knowledge which thrives on the objectification of human beings.
89Marcel, Positions and Approaches
,
quoted in Reinhardt,
The Existentialist Revolt
,
p. 215.
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problems is an inauthentic tendency.
The distinctions made by Marcel are important in
their consequences for education. Authentic participation
through secondary reflection must inform educational prac-
tices. But this entails passion and involvement and confron-
tation. Most of what goes on in schools, for example, writing
and reading lack such participation. A problematic approach
objectifies, separates and prevents a "living-in" that must
be encouraged in the name of authentic human-being. I will
also develop this later as support for imaginative literature
as an important means for teacher training.
Note here that to participate in mystery is a trans-
cending act. This brings us back to Jaspers who maintained
that man is more than his empirical existence and it is only
by transcending to another mode of existence that man may
touch his fuller, more authentic humanity.
Marcel, here, would say that an authentic person
approaches being as a mystery in which he, as well as the
object facing him, are enveloped by the presence of being.
This will also lead us later, when I discuss teacher training,
to see the issue as not "how shall we teach?" but "how shall
we be?" Briefly, most textbooks on teaching treat it as a
series of problems: the problem of discipline, the problem
of teaching reading to ghetto children, the problem of motiva-
tion, the problem of evaluation, etc. The distinctions Marcel
explores suggest strongly that there are crucial differences
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between looking at teaching-learning as a problem and look-
ing at it as a mystery.
l hen a person treats life only as a series of prob-lems to be overcome, he is inauthentic. To treatbeing Lteachingj as a problem is to reject the
appeal to authentically participate in being- itis to close the self off from the presence of be-ing. To approach it as mystery is to begin to re-spond to the call of being to participate; it isto authentically respond to the ontological need
and to open oneself to being's presence.90
Marcel writes of degrading the mystery to the status of a
problem:
The ontological order can only be recognized per-
sonally by^ the totality of a being engaged in adrama which is nis own, which at the same time it
surpasses him infinitely in every sense—a being
to whom has been imparted the unioue power of af-firming or negating himself depending on whether
hs
^
affirms oeing and opens himseii to it—or negatesbeing and thereby closes himself to it; in this di-lemma resides the very essence of freedom. 91
Participation, ior Marcel, is transcending the subject—object
split, to be in relationship rather than to have a relation-
ship. Ihe world today, whether we're talking of education,
psychotherapy, religion, politics, family, or what, insists
on objectification, having
, reducing man from his presence-
to—mystery • In one of his plays, Le Monde Casse
.
Christiana
says:
Don't you feel sometimes that we are living—if you
can call it living—in a broken world? Yes, broken
like a broken watch. The mainspring has stopped
9°E. V/. Dillon, Development of an Engl i sh Ed. Course
from an Examination ol Six Existentialist Philosophers
,
19 6S
.
9
^Marcel, Being-Having
,
p. 174.
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v/orking. Jus^ to look at itj nothing has changed#
Everything is in place* But put it to your ear
and you don't hear it ticking.
. . . The v;orld ofhuman creatures * • • had a heart at one time but
it stopped beating. 92
9Parcel, The Mystery of Being , Vol. I, pp. 22-23.
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CHAPTER IV
DIFFICULTIES IN CURRICULARIZING
EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY
Man is more than may be known conceptually of him."
The existentialists dealt with here are not inter-
ested in sketching a picture of the physical world, or in
outlining the nature of man, or in giving us a new meta-
physical theory. Rather their philosophizing is designed
to reawaken us to our own authentic human situation. And
for both Jaspers and Marcel this situation is of such a sort
that any effort to freeze it conceptually or dogmatically,
any attempt to schematize it exhaustively, or turn it into
something known, must end in a falsification of the situation
itself and in a destruction of our own authentic possibili-
ties (mystery and Existenz)
. The aim of their philosophizing
then is to call attention to the limits of knowledge not with
the skeptical purpose of disposing of knowledge altogether,
but rather in order to let the truth which always lies just
beyond those limits shine through for a moment.
But let us get closer to the educational problem.
Education in the 20th century seems to have a compulsive na-
ture about it. People seem to be investing in education all
of their hopes for a grander, clearer, less desperate future.
Leaving aside the question of whether schools can adequately
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assume such a burden, it is clear that education is today a
matter of great deliberate planning and constant reform
.
Everyone is considering how to improve it or completely re-
think its base. Everyone is busy organizing education, plan-
ning, regulating, and enforcing. Jaspers talks of these
activities but from the totalitarian point of view,
In the totalitarian world, education, like every-thing else, is totally planned and accordingly
regulated, and enforced in the smallest detail.There, tne cause is self-certain, clear, and un-
equivocal. The totalitarians know how they wantto do things. They organize education like ma-
chinery irom scientific-technological points of
view, especially from psychological ones. 93
But these points of view are operant in the free
world also. We have already seen how the premises of sci-
ence and psychoanalysis lead to the reductionism of man’s
being. ./hen we xorget the limitations of science and scien
tific planning, we can lose ourselves in the promises of re
formers. Jaspers said:
On the whole, the reduction of education to a pro-
cessing of man into a useful, obediently functioning
tool of labor gives a strong impetus to participa-
tion in a power which promises to bring about a
magnificent future. It fills the masses with an
urge to plunge into the tide, to lose themselves
in functionalization, to become materiel, and to
make materiel of others. 94
If we in the free world do not want to destroy the
human spirit in the process of planning, then we must ask
9
^Carl Jaspers, Philosophy and the World
, pp. 22-23.
9ifIbid., p. 23.
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some hard questions: what manner of educational planning
would separate us from the totalitarian processing? If not
useful and obedient functioning, then what should give direc-
tion to our planning? Is there some "ground" that gives
direction? Are we informed by some sense of what man is so
we can proceed to organize without violating that sense?
If we don't have that sense, then the temptations of scien-
tific eificiency, expediency, and arrogance will be too
strong for us. Planning and organizing in education may be
necessary. We need to protect ourselves, however, not from
planning but from a false spirit in this planning and es-
pecially from a "planning that would comprehend the incom-
prehensible . "95
Most existential tninkers and especially Jaspers and
Marcel, snow a distaste for system building. Rational cate-
gories can be neatly and coherently ordered; existence defies
conceptualization. The existential movement which Jaspers
and Marcel represent, really began as a reaction to absolute
schemes that purport to encompass and explain all existence.
It seems to me that it would be valuable then to
struggle with an education in the limits of knowledge
. Such
an education would necessarily, it seems to me, be philosophi-
cal in method and religious in intent. It would have the
distinctive asset, unlike modern education, of asking the
95 j.bid «
,
p. 24.
most important questions and hence being religious in na-
ture. Since man himself, to the inter—subjective existen-
tialists, is always more than what he can know himself to
be, then an education worthy of the name human must never
imply that man is exhaustible by any conceptual and scien-
tific knowledge. It would be an education of men who,
"•
• • experience the maturity of that critical point where
everything turns upside down, where one understands more
and more that there is sometning which one cannot under—
stand. ”96
Hence, these existentialist thinkers have unfortu-
nately never formulated educational programs. They have on
occasion commented briefly on this subject, as have
Kierkegaard, Buber, Tillich, etc., but they have never asked
themselves, at least in print, what might an educational
program be which is informed by existential insights? I
believe the reason for this, and it will bring us to a com-
monality of Jaspers and Marcel as well as those mentioned
above, is a fear of erecting a conceptual framework of ab-
stract policies, procedures and arrangements which will dis-
tract people into meeting external goals and thereby losing
the existential locus. The temptation to do so is strong as
Professor Fallico explains:
The existential attitude represents not so much
another philosophical position among many, as it
96jaspers, Reason-Existenz
, pp. 25 -26 .
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does, I think, the issue of any philosophy whichcomes to muturaty and to self-consciousness. Whenmen first awaken to the need of reflection, theybegin usually oy directing their sight on thethings farthest removed from themselves. Onlv asthey return dis-heartened to the starting-point
rich in the knowledge of non-purposive objects but
sell
-understanding, do they sometimes comek
.
S
^
a
f
e±y on their own human condition—onthe fact that it is of their own existence. 97
How then do vie approach and utilize the insights of existen-
tial philosophers when to utilize means to objectify a
philosophy which, at least for Marcel and Jaspers, screams
against just that? Jaspers and Marcel both believe that
discursive thought can never arrive at a universally valid
concept of being but only at one view of Being among others.
Jaspers said:
It matters, for this philosophy, who asks the ques-
tion as to the nature 01 this Being: man's concrete
historical situation enters into the question andinto the answer. In each individual, in all hisinsecurity and disquiet, philosophy must make a new
start $ hence it is always in process and always in
suspension, it is never complete and final and can
never be set forth in the form of a universally and
eternally valid doctrine. 98
For Jaspers, at the level of Existenz, there is no
universal validity. The conceptual attempt at clarification
is futile. He repeatedly speaks, as do all existentialists,
of a basic in man which lies beyond all that the social sci-
ences and physical sciences can discover, viz., what is
called the soul, ego, psyche, or innermost self. He says,
^Arturo Fallico, "Existentialism and Education," Edu-
cational Theory
.
IV (April, 1954), p. 166.
^°VET (Jaspers), p. 90.
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./hat in mythical terminology are called the souland God, and in philosophical language Existenzand transcendence,
.
. . .do not have the same modebeing as the things in the world
. . . but theycan have some other. Although they a rP n nf kno*Jt h eyr are not nothing
,
and our failure to come to
'X
arfnot
V
|hfSghf oi'!99them d°eS n0t “P1* that
Martin Buber deepens our sense of the limits of
intellection when he strongly insists on the betrayal of
religiousness by conceptual means. What is singular about
his point is his repeated insistence that in unreserved
attentiveness to another person, we meet God: "In each 'you'
we meet the eternal
-You. -100 Buber x don , t think means
here that when we address man, we address God at the same
time but rather that when a person gives himself completely
to the service of others, or when a man loves a woman so
much that both forget themselves entirely and feel only what
is "between" them (Buber's preposition) they live if only
momentarily, in some space between them. Buber's encounters
of man with man involves a discovery of something new, i.e.,
the between, which in addition to being new, is not compre-
hensible in terms of previous experience. To Buber, all this
yields theological insights. God is not "known" intellectu-
ally but experienced. The source of God is existential. God
is "grounded" much closer to us and discovered in the intimacy
of personal encounters. It is not intellect or searching or
9^Karl Jaspers, Philosophie
,
Vol. II, p. 1.
^9Martin Buber, I and Thou
,
p. 101.
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escaping but simple existential presence.
It seems to me, that if the mystery and irreduci-
bility of human existence is not to be violated, then it is
necessary, as when we would know God, that we speak and
listen to each other. The rich treasures of personality
cannot be "grasped" as we grasp the objects of science;
human richness in and out of the classroom must be created
through invitation and word .
Access to mystery and being seems to involve a turn—
ing from the direct method of teaching something to someone.
Direct communication is objective, focusing on the impersonal
"what." Like Marcel's "problem" the "what" exists out there
and we confront it as something separate, challenging, to be
manipulated and conquered. But if the essential concern is
the student's passionate relationship to his knowledge and
the commitment fostered, then personal appropriation and
"living-in" become the goal.
The use of literature, it seems to me, offers a way
out of the "betrayal of our mystery." Literature, as do all
the arts, speaks to the whole man. It thrusts upon the
reader, if he would make himself accessible, an immediacy;
out of the artist's "presence" to his world, a "between" is
t
created that we may enter into. Literature expresses what
is inexpressible conceptually. It refuses to "name" a thing,
as if to name it would kill its chances of entering the
imagination. Shakespeare seems to suggest the same danger
62
when in one of his plays he talks of an Elizabethan game
called "bowls.” The object of the game is to pitch a ball
in such a way that it comes close to the lead ball but
doesn't touch it. Literature engages the whole man on an
imaginative non—conceptual level, taking the long way
around, dislocating the language into a poem or story. Why
not go straight to the point? Is not the shortest distance
between two points a straight line? Why not simply hit the
lead bowl? Perhaps access to human mystery is not linear
and as E. E. Cummings has said, "A world of made is not a
world of born. I'rost also suggests the notion of access
when he claimed that the right reader of the right poem
receives an immortal wound j. rom which he will never recover
That is to say
,
that a work of art is more liable to pene-
trate to the existential, concrete, immediate "I" than the
rational exchange so characteristic of modern education.
Dewey has said:
It is by way of communication that art becomes the
incomparable organ of instruction, but the way is
so remote from that usually associated with the
idea of education, it is a way that lifts art so
far above what we are accustomed to think of as
instruction that we are repelled by any suggestion
of teaching and learning in connection with art. . . .
our revolt is in fact a reflection upon education
that proceeds by methods so literal as to exclude
the imagination and one not touching the desires
and emotions of man. 161
161John Dewey, Art as Experience
, p. 347*
63
The question always for education is: how may we
do justice to the part (whole?) of human existence left over
after rationality and conceptualization have had their day?
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CHAPTER V
DIALOGICAL TEACHING: ALL REAL
TEACHING IS MEETING
It is als° possible for a leader in business tobusiness with dialogue by meeting the men
with whom he works as persons. Even when°he cannot
meet them directly, he can be "inwardly aware with
a latent and disciplined fantasy, of the multitude
of persons," so that when one of them does step be-fore him as an individual, he can meet him "not as
a number with a human mask but as a person. "102
Recently I ooserved an English class in operation
and while sitting in the rear I noticed a sign on the wall
entitled: Twelve Reasons for Shakespeare's Greatness. And
somehow in an immediate flash of understanding, it came to
me that this is what is wrong with our educating, namely,
our* insistence on oojecuifying that which is un—object ifyable.
Shakespeare's greatness can only be a matter of conscious-
ness, of "presence," of participation and these like being
itself cannot be shown and cannot be indicated. This is what
Marcel means when he says that being can only be alluded to,
a little as some third person now disappeared is alluded to
amongst friends who knew him formerly and keep his memory
green. And even this comparison is useful only if the memory
of the person who has disappeared is not converted into an
object about which we are "discursive and ratiocinative. The
10Maurice Friedman, The Life of Dialogue
,
p. SB.
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being in question, who has become active subject, must mag-
netise a certain silence charged with memory and affec-
tivity. ”103
No doubt the teacher, in creating such a sign as
described above, was attempting, in good faith, to make the
notion of Shakespeare's greatness more real. It did not
occur to her as it does not to the whole educational estab-
lishment that consciousness and being are slippery, espe-
cially when thought is used as access to them. The aim of
being, like the aim of "participation," is to pass beyond
the point of opposition between me and what confronts me.
This is again to restate the problem of being and having
developed earlier.
The question for the teacher must be how to invite
pupils to be present to the subject matter so that it ceases
to be objectified as subject matter. But this can only come
about on the condition that the teacher is present to the
material which means a connection to it, a living-in-the-
material. One of the ways to understand this is perhaps to
say that the teacher and his students must work up the kind
of sweat that the author felt in his writing. Else, what are
they reading: surely not the same words he wrote! And it is
when the pupils "live-in" the same spaces as the writer that
the barrier between present and past is transcended. The
10
- Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal
, p. VIII.
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pupils then ’’participate" in all men’s longings and struggles
to create themselves and extend themselves. If this is so,
then this "participation" also transcends the present in the
direction of the future.
This kind of teaching through presence then, binds
up present, past and future and it is through this presence
that the pupil participates in his own freedom to create.
Buber v.ould say here tnat the pupil learns "to know con—
cretely the becoming of the human creature.
. .
.”104
But it must be understood that access to this pres-
ence cannot be had except through passion. What this means
is that the teacher must authentically feel the existential
questions himself, to have remained existentially alive.
The existential teacher continuously asks such questions as:
What does it mean to be educated? What is my vocation? What
conditions make it possible for love to be? What are my mo-
tives? What are my responsibilities to myself, to society,
to the subject which I teach, and to my students? How does
education affect my life? What is my view of death? Have I
created docile disciples or independent thinkers? Have I
created isolated thinkers along with independent thinkers?
The inauthentic teacher can hide behind knowledge as one more
"arrangement" along with the curriculum, the schedule, and
academic respectability. Buber says of the existential
10A-I4. Buber, Philosophical Interrogations , p. 68.
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teacher that:
to rescue one's real personal self from the fiery
^ *
jaws of the collectivism which devours all self-hoodThe longing to do this is hidden in thn nain -t- Vi q+-
the longing as well. To keep this pain alive and°to'
awaken tne longing—this is the first task of every-
one who regrets the obscuring of eternity. This is
also the primary task of the genuine educator in ourtune . 10 -5im
.
This presence to pain and longing is not a problem
objectified and out there to be solved. It is the condition
—
6-Q. -i-n f\ human. either we attack it, politicize it, manipu-
late it; or we open ourselves to its humanizing force.
To know how far we are from this- presence
, we only
need to note our predilection for political solutions to
what we conceive of al political problems. It is a slippery
thing to keep hold of consciousness ; in fact, as soon as we
consider it as something to keep hold of
.
it has already be-
come objectified and politicalized. Although we do need
sometimes to take hold of our world, to impose order and
exercise control, there is another mode of being-in-the-world,
one which vie could say serves as the source of that other
more politicalised mode. This other mode takes place in a
matrix of imagery, art, poetry, and metaphor. While the
first mode is essentially logical, scientific and seeks to
Buber. Between Man and Man (Boston: Beacon Press,
19.56), p. 110.
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create order, the second stirs the imagination. Every man
should be aware of his concrete world and its problems, of
himself as a man of a certain century with its particular
problems. But to know about and to solve these problems is
not the same as to know about the limitations of existence:
to know about home and homelessness. To state the issue
bluntly and in the form of a question: to what extent can
political solutions solve or even touch existential matters?
How much of the existential pain and uncertainty can be
remedied by political action? A socio-political situation
is capable of being changed by political action and by vari-
ous endeavors which are related to political action. The
existential situation, insoiar as it is truly existential,
has its remedy (to the extent that it needs or can have a
remedy) in non-political forms of behavior. These forms of
behavior are the quest for self-knowledge, the working toward
maturity—a reconciliation with the existential facts of life.
Man is more than the political exhortations of teachers and
politicians. This is the message of Antigone. It is behind
the scene in very nearly all of James Baldwins writing on
the predicament of the Black in the United States. He points
out that the naive political remedy for Blacks' problems
might give them "everything” that tne white man has—but is
this, after all, what the dignity of man, black or white,
requires? The white man's life is by no means the norm of
human dignity, and to define the Blacks’ ends in these terms
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is to collaborate in his betrayal. The problem, then, and
all great teachers speak to this problem, is: how do we
distinguish between what we must dc for ourselves, as human
beings, and what can we do politically, as the makers of
socio-economic systems?
But obviously oefore an answer can come to this
question, men must be more sensitive and aware of these two
modes of being, especially the existential since that is so
severely slighted in the modern age. And schools slight it
also. Surrounded for six hours by "arrangements" which are
by nature social and political, no wonder there is no con-
tact with their human—ness. Even humanities courses, tra-
ditionally the time of "connecting" with man's hopes, dreams,
joys, disquietude, have given themselves over to analysis
and objective knowledge, and people wonder at the desecra-
tion of property, the furious anger and desperation of school
children.
Most learning, including courses in humanities, turn
out to be variations of "Twelve Reasons for Shakespeare's
Greatness." At the level of Existenz, there is no universal
validity as in "Twelve Reasons for Shakespeare’s Greatness."
The conceptual attempt at clarification is futile.
While the truth may ultimately be one, the oneness
cannot appear to us directly. The truth of Existenz
lies more in the act than in the content. Existen-
tial thought is either true, and then it is indis-
solubly connected with the being of the thinker; or
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it is false!1§£
t0 ^ kn0WCl like any other
>
and then
Instances abound in educational situations of people
asking the wrong questions, in this case, un-existential
questions. And, of course, it is a truism, that the answers
people get depend on the questions they ask. Ever since men
ha/e thought about education, a conflict has existed which
can be expressed, although over-simplified, by the questions
shall we teach children? or shall we teach subject matter?
It seems to me that this way of phrasing the cues—
inevitably leads to polar positions which confuse
rather than clarify. And the polar confusions translate
inevitably into the terms: liberal/conservative or
progressivist/essentialist
,
etc. Often when conflicts re-
main intense over a long period of time, that is a sign that
both sides possess some truth and perhaps it is time to go
beyond the traditional way of phrasing the questions.
At first glance, the existentialists would seem to
align themselves with the progressivist s. Isn’t man’s
unique experience the subject matter rather than someone
else’s experience written down in books? It would seem so
until we ask: why cannot the encounter with knowledge be an
experience? Mot as some abstract body of accumulated knowl-
edge but as something into which I enter and participate,
something to which I become "present," where, as Marcel
106VET, p. 90.
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suggests, the distinction between what is in me and what is
in front of me disappears. But note that when we ask the
question in this form, we no longer objectify either stu-
d.ent or knowledge as something apart from one another.
Learning, in what I am going to call the dialogical sense of
the word, is fusion and not fission, a walking into spaces
that can be created by a dialogical teacher.
Immediately the question ceases to be: which shall
we teach, subject or child? and becomes: is the teacher
present to the subject matter? how to invite the pupil’s
presence? The authoritarian teacher who sees himself as the
holder of knowledge and the students as receptacles for the
knowledge ignores the student and what he brings to the
learning situation. But the progressivist teacher who sees
himself as the clearer-of-the-path so that the latent crea-
tive powers within the student will spontaneously erupt ig-
nores the disciplines necessary to learning. But more to
the point about these two ways of rationalizing the problem
is that both ignore the significance and power of the rela-
tionship between teacher and student upon which so much de-
pends.
There is no conflict between the intellectual
discipline- and the student-teacher realtionship
;
the two
belong together. That which is taught comes from man's
relation with himself, others, and the world in which they
live. Learning, then, should not be abstracted from that
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relating, that being-in-the-world. This suggests that knowl-
edge is personal knowledge or it reduces and degrades human
beings oy offering itself as reproducible and verifiable to
beings who are replaceable, so to speak. This democratiza-
tion of human beings occurs daily in schools on every level.
Knowledge, that which is taught, comes from man*s
relation with himself
,
others, and the world in which they
live. Knowledge, then, is not the pre-condition for dia-
logue
,
it is the end result. e know oecause we encounter
the world. In history teaching, for example, there is an
erroneous assumption that historical meaning is inherent in
the past. 10 put it another way, historical consciousness,
the awareness that we emerge from a history, is a temptation
to understand the present exclusively from the past. We
forget very easily that the past can offer explanations only
after and to the extent that it itself has become understand-
able through the present . Knowledge and meaning, then, are
always the result of dialogue and encounter. The dialogical
teacher could not be satisfied with the transmission of
"knowledge,” content, subject matter. These are not the end
result but the raw material for human meanings which emerge
out of human presence and participation. The end result must
be literally created anew. There ±s no other way to think
of learning without reducing man to the level of thing.
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Communication is Not Dialogue
It is somewhat interesting to note that even for
those educators who profess critical thinking and discussion
as high-priority goals, little philosophical justification
is offered beyond what appears to meet the needs of a demo-
cratic citizenry. The context and thrust of existential
thought, on the other hand, with its insistence on the end-
less ambiguity of all existence and action, suggests that
insofar as we are honest we live in a "sea of reflection
where no one can call to another, where all buoys are dia-
lectical." 10? But this reflection is, precisely through its
endlessly active dialectic, the condition of freedom. Infi-
nite reflection is possibility; it is the form in which I
permit myself to know about what I am not yet, and a prepara-
tion for it.
Existence is a question, and existential teaching
would seek to return the pupil to the larger questions, the
sense of the predicament, the life-giving tensions which
transform the pupil and make him more lucid about himself as
a human being.
A dialogical education, then, would be quite differ-
from current school practices which center around commu-
nication. Huebner states that, "Communication implies only
the transfer of information from one to another, whereas
dialogue suggests that the recipient act on this information,
10|/Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz
, p. 32.
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reshape it or himself and continue the dialogue at a new
level* Dialogue demands the acceptance and acknowledg-
ment of the reality and value of the other person. Figure 1
depicts individuals in the act of communication:
Figure 2 depicts individuals in dialogue:
C D
U
What is diificult to depict is that in figure 2, extended
meanings are created^ there exists a condition of "openness
to experience*" In dialogue each individual comes to oper-
ate as a "first behaver." In this condition, for example,
the teacher would not demand behavior from others: he is,
with the students, a beginner, a "first behaver," inquiring
into meanings. This suggests that he searches his own think-
ing with meanings rather than isolate himself as the "settled
one" with knowledge. In the approach to dialogue the indi-
vidual moves out of the "role" behavior which captivates him
in connection with routinized and institutionalized tasks.
When a teacher communicates in the systematized role, he does
so in terms of the language of the ueacher. When he is in
Dwayne Huebner, "New Modes of Man's Relationship to
Man," in New Insi ghts and the Curriculum
,
Yearbook Associa-
tion for Supervision and Curriculum Development (Wash., D. C.,
1963), p. 146.
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dialogue he finds himself within the language of himself as
a person. Likewise, the talk which proceeds in connection
with subject matter is in terms of that content. What we
are after here is a "presence” to one's existence, a "pres-
ence" attainable or approachable only through dialogue where
people trust their minds enough to "live in" the meanings
and hence extend their own meanings.
Knowledge is not "out there" readymade and waiting
to be appropriated. It is that which results from and not
predates encounter. Likewise meaning needs to be created by
an individual who behaves (as in figure 2) as a first one
with meaning. This does not mean that subject matter has no
place in learning: areas of knowledge are the product of
living and thinking men, and it is "presence" to their lives
and their attempts at extended meanings which must be entered
into. Again the question is not "what to teach" but "how to
be present to the world and knowledge." Any other goal re-
duces both the goal and the knowledge. On the other hand,
such a presence to knowledge as is being suggested here is
itself an example of authentic dialogue.
In presenting a poem, for example, the dialogical
teacher would simply present it—not to teach or instruct
but only because the poem expresses a significant dimension
of the teacher's world. The teacher fuses with something
that compels, invites, activates, and challenges himself to
new awareness and meanings. In Buber's terms, a "between" is
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created, something additional to the person and the material.
This non-objectifying participation is the invitation for
students to enter: existential spaces are created into
which humans enter with their whole selves risking meaning
.
Without this dialogical encounter, there would be
no present; the poem's reality would exist only in the past
as it fit into a teacher's categories of knowledge. Either
the teacher "meets" with the poem in "presence" or the poem
withholds its truth. The same is true for persons: either
the teacher becomes fully present to the pupil or the pupil
withholds his reality • A teacher does not gain access to a
student through his perceptions which are incomplete or the
categories into which tne student iits since those categories
inevitably reduce the reality. Knowledge is through presence
—to spirit and not only to matter. In talking of the "truth"
of God, Buber almost indicates that without "meeting" and the
creation of the "between," there is no truth;
Any genuine human life-relationship to Divine
Being—i.e. any such relationship effected with
a man's whole being—is a human truth, and man
has no other truth. The ultimate truth is one,
but it is given to man only as it enters, re-
flected as in a prism, into the true life-
relationships of the human person. 109
Likewise the truth of the student's being is a human
truth, not as an objective thing tc be used, classified, or
trained but gathered into presence
,
gathered into a teacher's
l^piartin Buber, quoted in Maurice Friedman, The Life of
Dialogue (New York, 1955), p. l6l.
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being-in-the-world. The achievement of this relation re-
sults in "Trust, trust in the world because this human
being exists— ."110
Once long ago there were no teachers and no schools.
Young people apprenticed themselves to coppersmiths, phil-
osophers, religious men and, through the apprenticeship,
learned, in addition to the skills, "and without noticing
that they did, che mystery of personal life: they received
the spirit." 111 The problem with which I've tried to deal
here in this paper is precisely: how to bring about the
"receiving of the spirit" and how to do this in a modern
educational enterprise which has forgotten such words and
such a presence as spirit. Always, the best of teaching has
been a teacher who can discover and nourish in the soul of
the student what that teacher has recognized in himself as
the right. And because it is the right, it must also be
living in the student as a possibility, unlocked not through
instruction but existential meeting.
The central idea of this existential meeting is a
difficult one to keep hold of: as both Marcel and Jaspers
point out, the world instructs mightily in objectifying
things and persons. Dialogical education is difficult also
in that it approaches quickly the area of love, community,
and religion. As such it is, to say the least, not easily
11
^Martin Buber, Between Man and Man , p. 94.
111Ibid
.
,
p. 90.
translated into pedagogical terminology; in fact, what is
needed is an existential vocabulary for the educational
situation.
That educators miss the truth of dialogue can be
seen in the now shaky hopes invested in the free school
movement. Thinking that the opposite of authoritarian
teaching is ireedom, the free school people abandoned the
notion of "teacher" and hence abandoned the youngsters. As
Buber points out:
... at the opposite pole from compulsion there
stands not freedom but communion. Compulsion is
a negative reality; communion is the positive
reality; freedom is a possibility, possibility
regained. At the opposite pole of being compelled
by destiny or nature or men there does not stand
being free of destiny or nature or men but to com-
mune and to covenant with them. To do this it is
true that one must first have become independent;
but this independence is a foot-bridge, not a
dwelling place. 112
Hence, teaching is "meeting." But this idea, as
most of the ideas in this paper, is artistic rather than
scientific. As such, it defeats the effort to put it into
a formula. Rather it has to be felt and grasped by the wise
teacher, who, either from the gift of happy intuition or
through patient reflection on his own successes and failures
has come to understand the dialogical relation.
Pernaps what is being asked for is saintliness. Per
haps we have become so preoccupied with the science of educa
tion, the Dasein-analysis (Jaspers) and the problematical
ll^Martin Buber, I and Thou, p. 91-
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(Marcel)
,
that we have neglected to take note of the artistry
it exacts in practice.
Finally, Buber again:
In an age which is losing form ... the ones who
count are those persons who—though they may be
of little renown—respond to and are responsible
for the continuance of the living spirit", each in
the active stillness of his sphere of work.H3
113 Ibid
.
,
p. 131.
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CHAPTER VI
WHAT DEATH MAY YIELD: TOWARD AN
EXISTENTIAL CURRICULUM
Since existentialism focuses on the notions which
indicate a man's personal relationship with the world, no-
tions such as death, love, hate, anxiety, fear, etc., these
notions are not only appropriate for school curriculum but
necessary if schools mean to touch deeper levels within its
student-humans. The purpose of the following pages is to
deal with death as a sample existential issue, to explore
what the acknowledgment of death can yield in human terms,
and to explore the issue of death as school curriculum as a
possibility of extending human existence.
In Ernest Hemingway's story, "A Day's Wait," nine-
year-old Schatz thinks he is going to die of influenza because
he has a temperature of 102 degrees, and he has heard that
44 degrees means certain death. During the few hours' dura-
tion of the story, he is in full control of himself, solici-
tous of his father's well-being, even in the face of his own
impending death, and generally acts not like the typical nine-
year-old boy. At the end when his father discovers Schatz'
s
confusion over Centigrade and Fahrenheit, he explains that
Schatz is not about to die. Whereupon Schatz 's hold over
himself relaxed and he cried easily at "little things that
were of no importance."
Death, says Kierkegaard, is "the test of earnest-
ness. ”11^ Earnestness is sincerity, or, in the Latin, sine
ceras, "the absence of wax"—it is the purity of existence.
Death tests this purity, as it did in the case of Schatz.
Schat-z was purified, put away all unimportant things,
and perhaps in facing death was closer to the "pain-sharing
of all men" and hence could feel care and concern for his
father as well as others in the house.
One of Karl Jaspers' most important theories, it was
seen, is that of the limit-situation in which we must either
develop into something larger and finer or lose our souls.
Surely the foremost limit-situation is death where, as Sartre
puts it: freedom is revealed to man. Life is reduced to
its simplist terms and the way is cleared for the future.
Rollo May has elaborated on what the acknowledgment
of non-being can yield:
To grasp what it means to exist, one needs to grasp
the°fact that he might not exist that he treads at
every moment on the sharp edge of possible annihila-
tion and can never escape the fact that death will
arrive at some unknown moment in the future. Exist-
ence, never automatic, not only can be sloughed off
and forfeited but is indeed at every instant ^threat-
ened by non-being. Without this awareness of non-
being—that is, awareness of the threats to one's
living in death, anxiety, and the less dramatic but
persistent threats of loss oi potentialities in
conformism—existence is vapid, ^unreal, and cnarac-
terized by lack of concrete se±f~awareness. But
with the confronting of non-being, existence takes
on vitality and immediacy, and the individual
114S . Kierkegaard, Thoughts on Crucial Situation ^—in
Human Life, trans. by David Bwenson (Minneapolis: nugsbur^,
I9"4l7 1 p« 9 •
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experiences a heightened consciousness of himself
his world, and others around him. 115
Certainly, it may be said of Hemingway's story, that Schatz
came to a different level of self-consciousness and, more-
over, a heightened consciousness of all the people in the
house.
Almost all existentialists hold that the confronting
of death gives the most positive reality to life itself. It
makes the individual's existence real and concrete, makes
him realize the potentiality of being and non-being in others
when he realizes the inescapable nature of his own death.
But we need not go as far as the extreme example of
death to see the problem of non-being. Rollo May again:
Perhaps the most ubiquitous and ever-present form
of the failure to confront non-being in cur day is
in conformism, the tendency of the individual to
let himself be absorbed in the sea of collective
responses and attitudes, to become swallowed up in
das Man
,
with the corresponding loss of his own
awareness, potentialities, and whatever character-
izes him as a unique and original being.
Hence, death and the encounter with death, and the
acknowledgment of death are intimately tied up with the prob-
lem of living. The question is: why isn't this area ex-
plored and articulated more often and why doesn't education
deal with the potentiality of death as an existential no-
tion? It is not hard to find reasons, for in our society at
large there is a widespread repression of death.
115Roi1o May, Existence , pp. 46, 49.
H^Rollo May, p. 49.
This repression of* death is pervasive in America,
perhaps in all modern ,/estern civilizations# Even suggest—
this topic as curriculum*’ lor public education brings
on doubt and reticence.^ Death ls for us obscene and
unmentionable, not to be looked at if one can help it. We
have big funeral services which seem to demonstrate that,
after all, the person did not die. We buy "life insurance"
which doesn’t insure our lives but others’ economic well-
being in the event of our death . Geoffrey Gorer thinks that
in this denial of death lies the root of the violence and
sadism that comes out in American comics and television pro-
grams. He says:
Nevertheless, people have to come to terms with the
basic facts of birth, copulation, and death, and
somehow accept their implications; if social prud-
ery prevents this being done in an open and digni-
fied fashion, then it will be done surreptitiously.
If we dislike the modern pornography of death, then
we must give back to death—natural death—its pa-
rade and publicity, re-admit grief and mourning.
If we make death unmentionable in polite society
—
"not in front of the children"—we almost insure
continuation of the "horror comic." No censorship
has ever been really effective.^i^
The Jesuit writer Father William Lynch notes the effect of
the Christian misuse of hope playing into the American illu-
sion that we can somehow escape death:
studies of death and death symbolism in Hiroshima
by Robert Jay Lipton.
Tl^Geoffrey Gorer, "The Pornography of Death," in The
Berkley Book of Modern Writing, #3, ed. bv William Phillips
’(New York: Berk publishing Company, 1956), p. 62.
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\<hat follows lor the imagination if it does not havethe elementary gift of dealing directly with theimage and fact, ox death? It will then' deal with itindirectly
,
that is to say, in bizarre ways* , , ,
Its usual formula is violence. The violent and sa-distic imagination, thereiore, rather than indicating
strength and masculinity, signifies the evasion of afact. The imagination must be a coping, not an evad-ing instrument
.
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Indeed, not only should imagination oe a coping instrument,
but so should the curriculum in a school cope, not evade,
existential issues of life, death, love, suffering, etc.
Is it possible that the violence and belligerence of Ameri-
cans, what is sometimes referred to as an irreverence for
life, is related to our repression of death. Our murderous
behavior in Vietnam, the slaying of un-armed Kent State Uni-
versity students, the unfeeling massacre of prison guards
and inmates at Attica: do we actually court death out of a
need to touch its reality, a reality which is not only vigor-
ously denied in itself in our culture but denied in its re-
lated expressions such as grief and mourning. How much of
our murderous behavior reflects a need to reclaim to our-
selves an act which is basic, ultimate, ubiquitous, and
charged with implications for our living? And denied.
But the issue must be pursued to another level yet.
Death is a personal phenomenon, the most "personal" thing in
the ultimate sense. This very personal nature of the experi-
ence is that which is repressed in our need to make death
Il%iiiiam Lynch, Images of Hope (Baltimore: Helicon
Press, 1965), p. 245.
impersonal. We refer to statistics and thereby obscure
death, we state that "one" dies, rather than that "I" die.
But to diminish awareness of such a personally ultimate
experience is to diminish the experience of being alive.
The critical issue in the facing of death lies in this area
of the human being* s heightened self-consciousness. Height-
ened consciousness of what? Blaise Pascal says:
Man is only a reed, the feeblest thing in nature;
but he is a thinking reed. There is no need for
the entire universe to arm itself in order to
annihilate him: a vapor, a drop of water, suf-
fices to kill him. But were the universe to crush
him, man would yet be more noble than that which
slays him, because he knows that he dies, and the
advantage that the universe has over him; of this
the universe knows nothing. Thus all our dignity
lies in thought. 1 ^0
Again, the awareness of death sharpens our sense of
being. The capacity to face death is the means by which we
gain freedom. In this awareness, existence becomes some-
thing that is not automatic: experience takes on vitality
and immediacy; I experience a heightened consciousness of
myself and of the world around me.
Death, as one of my students suggested, is the great
equalizer. Rollo May says:
The awareness of death is also the ultimate source
of human humility. The fact that we all at some
time die puts every man in the same boat with every
other human being, free or enslaved, male or female,
child or adult. Thus the facing of death is the
-*-20ro11o May, Restless Adventure , ed. by Shinn (New York
Scribner*s, 196 Sj
,
p. 20?.
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strongest motive and requirement that we be fellow
men. . . .1^1 —=—
—
This is what Theseus
,
the hero in Sophocles* Oedipus in
£olqnus, is saying: "I know I am only a man, and I have no
more to hope for in the end than you have." Death is the
humanizing fact which makes us fellow men. 122
V/hat both existential thinkers assert is that the
journey to authentic existence requires a personal, subjec-
tive confrontation with the ever-present possibility of one’s
own death. For Kierkegaard, it is a principle of individua-
tion. The individual must think ethically or subjectively
about it
—
his death, not man’s in general. If the individual
thinks of death so as to make a reality of it, his decisive-
ness grows. 12 3 To face death existentially helps the person
to become subjective, authentic, decisive.
For Jaspers, death is one of the six boundary situa-
tions. Facing death leads the individual to consider his
possible fulfillment in life. 12i+ Here again, death individu-
ates and frees the individual for choosing and creating him-
self. Facing in dread the limit situation of death enables
l^Rollo May, Restless Adventure
,
p. 208.
T22Human fellowship is also the goal of sensitivity
training. But I perceive an important difference in that
sensitivity training aims for fellowship through what is
possible, existential encounter aims through what is not
possibl e". The difference is not a negligible one.
T23Kierkegaard, Postscript
,
pp. 148-151*
124-Karl j asperSj, philosoohie , Vol. II, cited in Reinhardt,
The Existentialist Revolt
,
p . 197*
37
the person to separate the trivial from the significant and
thus challenge the person to live more fully, and to choose
more resolutely.
Marcel considers death a test of man*s creative
fidelity. It can av;aken man from inauthentic decisionless
life and force him to choose to accept the call to partici-
pate authentically by being open to other "thous."
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CHAPTER VII
IMAGINATIVE LITERATURE AS METHOD
We want schooling to be humanly effective but the
schools have no resonance. We do not really need to read
Silberman* s cook, Crisis in the Classroom
, to know that the
schools are full of pettiness and trivia. It is no differ-
ent in teacher training programs: here where it is so neces-
sary to touch our deepest selves so that we would know and
feel the real nature and challenge of our jobs as teachers,
we come face to face again with trivia.
Is it too much to ask, for example, that in between
the third graders* activities with coloring books, they are
read a story which reveals ambiguity and paradox? Is it too
much to ask the high school science teacher to take the time
in class to read one of Joseph Wood Krutch*s essays which
always vibrate with something human which exists beyond sci-
ence? Is it too much to ask that public schools deal with
the "holy" and the "sacred" and the "religious" in man, not
as dogma but as areas of being which resonate with mystery?
This past year I experimented with methods of teach-
ing a course in just such directions. Reading educational
philosophy failed because it consisted of philosophical ab-
stractions. Sensitivity sessions had failed because the
whole rationale lacks resonance, and in addition, I found it
S9
dixficulu to avoid objectifying people by surrounding them
with expectations.
Herce, I planned a course abound existentially edu-
cational literature. The purpose in dealing with literature
was to avoid "talking about" ideas and, instead, to "appro-
priate and involve" ourselves. Literature forces an experi-
ential irm..cdiacy on the reader j obviously that is why so
many existential philosophers preferred the art form. Since
a good work of art cannot be translated into other terms, it
becomes then a model for existential man who, since he too
cannot be translated, must contain mystery and resonance.
Frost says, "Poetry is the part lost in translation." In
Buber* s terms, a work of art can be a "thou" that addresses
the entire "I. "125
The point of using literature and the choice of what
literature to use was determined by one criterion: what will
help to make clear the distinction between the truth that is
impersonal and the truth that Keats says is "felt along the
pulse"? My students are middle-class Catholics who attended,
for the most part, all-male Catholic schools during their
lives. It became doubly clear to me that we needed to deal
with the distinction between known truth and lived truth,
between impersonal truth and personal truth, between statis-
tical truth and existential truth.
-^Buber, I and Thou , pp. 1-60.
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I hesitate to list the literature used, for to do so
would only add another ’’program'' with which teachers can
clothe themselves. Whereas it is important that people who
find me useful wear only my "garb." It should be remembered
that such a list is expandable, limited only by the neces-
sity of personal appropriation and "living-in" by the teacher,
the choices must have resonance, and perhaps that the en-
counter be applicable to education.
"The Idealist" by Frank O’Connor is a story about a boy who
tries to hold onto an inner liie containing courage,
honesty, and a "heroic style." The other students
and the schoolmaster (all in-authentic) resent his
strange behavior and proceed to kill off the boy’s
inner truth. This story works as a starting point
with which to deal with our own inner worlds and the
battles waged with the objective world.
"Paul’s Case" by Willa Cather tells of a high school boy who
detests the banality of school and school people.
Paul’s search for glamour and human color (resonance)
is symbolized (and outrages the school people) by a
red carnation he wears to school. Paul commits sui-
cide at the end in a way whxch exposes the grey and
colorless quality (Paul is a "case") of a machine-
like world.
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"Indian Camp" by Ernest Hemingway is a story of a young boy
who accompanies his physician father on a medical
errand where he witnesses a Caesarian birth (the
unjustified violence and pain of the world)
,
the
almost unmentioned sight of the woman's after-birth
(the ugly real world as opposed to the fairy-tale-
like world of a young boy)
,
and the suicide of the
Indian woman's husband (it is easier to die some-
times than to go on living) • On the way home the
boy wants to ask his father some very existential
questions about the truth of such a world but sud-
denly retreats once again into inauthentic boy-hood.
Buried Life by M. Arnold is a poem portraying the hidden
life in man, a life that is usually denied.
"Bartleby the Scrivener" by Herman Melville is a story of
existential estrangement of a clerk in a world which
has walled in (takes place on Wall Street) the human
parts of people.
"The Birthmark" by Nathaniel Hawthorne tells of a scientist
who reaches for perfection by removing a birthmark
from his otherwise perfect wife. She dies (while a
crippled and deformed assistant smiles) suggesting
the existential idea that humans can have perfection
but at the expense of life.
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"The Meaning of Awareness" by Joseph Wood Krutch who, as I
mentioned earlier, is so good at revealing the human
spaces which belong to the meta-scientific realm of
being.
"The Open Boat" by Stephen Crane tells of five shipwrecked
on the open and vast sea who come to the
23-t i on of the unfairness of life and want to
throw stones if only they knew at whom or where to
throw them! Such a story opens easily into our
estrangement and freedom which go together.
Antigone by Sophocles is a play which richly encounters the
conflict between the existential and the political,
of tne limits of ooth, oi that realm which needs or
may be approached as problem and that realm which
can only be approached as mystery. Antigone
, for
me, brings the ultimate question closer, the one that
should inform all that we as educators do: what does
it mean to be human?
The list is partial, examples of literature that I
have taken into myself • . • and fused with. When I "teach"
them, I do not "murder to dissect" but clear some spaces for
humans to connect and dilemmas to be felt. We need as teach-
ers to bring these human experiences to the conscious level
in order that what we do in the classroom with one another,
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we do with empathy. Through existential literature and en-
counter in dialogue, we enter deeply into human experiences
and glimpse the beauty and intensity and resources of the
human spirit which bring the "momentary stay against confu-
sion."
Conclusion
Only the paper concludes or seems to
. . . some-
where in the middle of this project, a presence
to man and the mystery came clearer
. . . and
presence means only beginnings.
I want to keep saying again and again that dilemmas
are not problems: they are the stuff of existing—frustrat-
ing and perplexing. At age forty-one I am still awed by
the unanswerable. I'm only more comfortable now in my dis-
comfort. I wish that someone had revealed to me at age
sixteen that running from the discomfort was indeed an al-
ternative, but that there was a price to pay. But instead
everyone was selling promises that heaven is just around the
corner. Even today utopian educators make promises and
prophesies from the right and the left. • Those on the right
argue that people need their "behavior modified." Those on
the left recommend that they have their "minds blown." The
first can be accomplished by the correct "social program."
The latter can be done by drugs and "sensitivity" games.
Both offer a cure. I, as a teacher-human, have given their
diagnoses and suggested remedies careful consideration. I
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choose the "sickness" of existence. The utopian planners,
especially the educational prophets, will one day understand
the demands of the spirit:
Nov/ I ask you: What can be expected of man since
he is a being endowed with such strange qualities 9
Shower upon him every earthly blessing, so that
nothing out bubbles of bliss can be seen on the
surface; give him economic prosperity, such that
he should have nothing else to do but sleep, eat
cakes, and busy himself with the continuation of
his species, and even then out 01 sheer ingrati-
tude, sneer spite, man would play you some nasty
trick. ... And if he does not find means he will
contrive destruction and chaos, will contrive suf-
ferings of all sorts, only to gain his point ! 126
The literature, then, is not used to find answers
but only for entrances. They are not to be used to offer
students any "cure" of relief from psychological labor and
pain. I have found that students will enter willingly into
the world of existential conflict. They will do so, I think
because contrary to common assumptions that human motivation
is biological, social, or psychological, human motivation
and human evolution are directed by a psychic energy that is
meta-physical. Meta-physical because the origins of this
energy cannot be determined: it is an existential given!
This idea of meta-physical motivation is very differ
ent from that which is meant when educators speak of "moti-
vation." It is not a matter for showmanship or any method
or technique but springs from a deeper source. The struggle
^26£jOS-k 0eVsky y Notes from the Underground .
95
to encounter and define this meta-physical motivation and
psychic energy has occupied philosophers and theologians
across cultures and time. That same struggle to encounter
the meta-physics of the self underlies the efforts of the
existential thinkers presented in this paper. It is the
-~k rans c cadence of Jaspers, the participation in mystery of
Marcel, and the dialogical teaching of Buber. It has always
been my goal as teacher, even before I knew it, to invite
students to encounter their existential selves, which means
to me, to stand in the presence of and acknowledge their
own meta-physical motivation.
But this energy is not a content, nor is the litera-
ture used as a content, nor is the teacher and his prepara-
tion to be thought of as content. There is a Hasiddic idea
that the holiest teaching is rejected if it is found in
someone only as a content of his thinking. The literature,
by participating itself in the depths of the human soul, in-
vites the student to do the same with the help of the teach-
er’s speaking voice. To what shall we teach? To the ’’sphere
of the between,” presence to the other, participation in the
meta-problematical and in the mystery, dialogical relating,
the speaking voice: all of these carried out in deeds and
by non-doing.
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